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THE ARBITRATION PENUMBRA:
ARBITRATION LAW AND THE RAPIDLY
CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF
DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Thomas J. Stipanowich*
INTRODUCTION
Arbitration law is implicitly founded on a procedural model involving
binding adjudication of disputes by a private tribunal pursuant to an agreement.1 Today, however, this “classic” model of arbitration is but one—albeit
highly important—alternative among a growing number of process templates
for resolving domestic and international disputes.2 These include mediation3
and many forms of third-party evaluation or nonbinding adjudication,4 multistep processes or integrated conflict management programs,5 and hybrids such
* Professor of Law, Pepperdine University; Academic Director, Straus Institute for Dispute
Resolution. The author wishes to thank Richard Reuben, Jean Sternlight, and Peter
Robinson for sharing valuable insights along the way and Pepperdine law students
Christopher Chatelain, Jonathan Hanks, and Ira Yasnogorodsky for going the extra mile as
research assistants.
1 See infra text accompanying notes 74-79.
2 See generally Amy J. Schmitz, Refreshing Contractual Analysis of ADR Agreements by
Curing Bipolar Avoidance of Modern Common Law, 9 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1 (2004);
Thomas J. Stipanowich, Contract and Conflict Management, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 831.
3 “[M]ediation is, by definition, a procedure by which the parties negotiate a resolution to
their dispute with the assistance of a third party mediator. If the parties do not reach an
agreement, the mediation process is at an end; no resolution may be imposed on the parties.”
Bowden v. Weickert, No. S-02-017, 2003 WL 21419175, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. June 20,
2003) (quoting Oliver Design Group v. Westside Deutscher Frauen-Verein, No. 81120, 2002
WL 31839158, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2002)); see also James R. Coben & Peter N.
Thompson, Disputing Irony: A Systematic Look at Litigation About Mediation, 11 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV. 43 (2006) (surveying cases discussing dramatic growth of mediation-related
litigation, including cases involving contractual agreements to mediate and mediated settlement agreements).
4 See CATHERINE CRONIN-HARRIS, BUILDING ADR INTO THE CORPORATE LAW DEPARTMENT: ADR SYSTEMS DESIGN 170 (1997) (including nonbinding neutral evaluation in the
scope of arbitration); see, e.g., Harrison v. Nissan Motor Corp., 111 F.3d 343 (3d Cir. 1997)
(recognizing informal dispute resolution procedure under automobile lemon law, resulting in
a nonbinding decision that may be enforced against the manufacturer if the customer accepts
it). Nonbinding arbitration procedures are required under some uninsured motorist statutes.
See, e.g., Patterson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 884 So. 2d 178 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). The same
is true of some mandatory fee arbitration statutes. See, e.g., Ervin, Cohen & Jessup, LLP v.
Kassel, 54 Cal. Rptr. 3d 685, 685 (Ct. App. 2007). It is also employed in some federal and
state court ADR programs. See, e.g., Furia v. Ziccarelli, 935 So. 2d 103, 103 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2006).
5 See infra text accompanying notes 9-11, 242-73.
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as “med-arb” and “arb-med.”6 Some are consensual approaches;7 others are
mandated as part of a government regulatory scheme.8
With the proliferation of dispute resolution alternatives have come questions about the legal enforceability of contractual agreements to submit disputes
to a process, the implications of a failure to comply with such agreements, or
the consequences of an agreement or decision reached through a process.
There are also important collateral issues involving the powers and duties of
third party arbitrators, mediators, and other “interveners” or “neutrals,” including their obligations to disclose information regarding potential conflicts of
interest, their ability to direct the production of testimony or documents and
make other procedural decisions, and the extent of their immunity from legal
process. Finally, there are issues about the confidentiality of information communicated during the process, its admissibility as evidence in other legal or
administrative proceedings, and its safeguarding from the prying eyes of third
parties.
Additional complexities attend the widespread and growing use of multistep dispute resolution processes in contracts of all kinds.9 Such procedures
commonly consign arbitration to a secondary or tertiary role in a spectrum or
sequence of approaches to resolve conflict. The primary emphasis is on negotiation or mediation in order to promote party control of solutions, address interests as well as rights, and permit less formal, less costly, and more efficient
dispute resolution.10 Sometimes, however, the obligation to engage in negotiation or mediation raises enforcement issues that involve arbitration law.11
Moreover, as lawyers garner experience with these processes and the
ranks of self-described professional neutrals asserting multi-faceted expertise
swell, some are experimenting with “switching hats” to play different neutral
roles in connection with a dispute.12 Although the practice goes against conventional wisdom in Anglo-American cultures,13 many neutrals have engaged

6

See infra text accompanying notes 13-15.
See generally Stipanowich, supra note 2.
8 See, e.g., Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2310 (2000); CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1793.22 (West 2007) (California Lemon Law).
9 See infra notes 242-73 and accompanying text.
10 See, e.g., Mary Rowe, Dispute Resolution in the Non-Union Environment: An Evolution
Toward Integrated Systems for Conflict Management?, in WORKPLACE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 79, 90 (Sandra E. Gleason ed., 1997) (discussing functions performed by various elements of integrated systems for resolving issues in the workplace).
11 See infra notes 247-73 and accompanying text.
12 See Neutrals Deployed Several Kinds of ADR to Solve IBM-Fujitsu Copyright Dispute,
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG., Jan. 1987, at 187 (describing shifting roles of two
“neutrals” in complex intellectual property disputes as arbitrators, mediators, system designers, and special masters supervising an ongoing program of dispute resolution); see also JAY
FOLBERG, DWIGHT GOLANN, LISA KLOPPENBERG & THOMAS STIPANOWICH, RESOLVING DISPUTES: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND LAW, 643-48 (2005).
13 Hugh F. Landerkin, Conflict Management: Are Skills and Theories Enough? The Qualities of a Third Party Conflict Intervener, ADRIC Conference: ADR Energy (Nov. 17, 2006),
http://www.adrcanada.ca/documents/3pconflictintervener.pdf.
7
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in “med-arb”14 or “arb-med.”15 These arrangements can give rise to legal
issues, often implicating the law of arbitration.16
Parties seeking judicial resolution of these issues with respect to a dispute
resolution agreement often invoke the Federal Arbitration Act or state arbitration statutes, with conflicting, often unpredictable results.17 Indeed, a survey of
the evolving judicial decisions on legal questions surrounding “appropriate dispute resolution (ADR)” reveals a landscape that remains “fundamentally aimless, meandering, and above all, confusing.”18 There is a need for clearer, more
carefully reasoned, and more reliable approaches to legal issues surrounding
dispute resolution processes.19
The body of judicially-declared law addressing these emerging forms of
appropriate dispute resolution and the interface between arbitration and other
processes—much of which has developed within the “penumbra” of federal
and state arbitration statutes—raises important questions about the underlying
policies, scope, and contours of arbitration law. This article will briefly survey
some of the “cases of trouble”20 that make up the evolving arbitration law
“penumbra.” Part I will explore the functions and potential impact of arbitration statutes on the enforcement of dispute resolution provisions, and the lack
of clarity surrounding the definition of “arbitration” and its consequences.21
14

See, e.g., Coughlan v. Coughlan, No. A03-206, 2003 WL 22136814 (Minn. Ct. App.
Sept. 16, 2003) (med-arb arrangement established by parenting plan agreed to by parents);
Local 85 of the Amalgamated Transit Union v. Port Auth., 840 A.2d 506, 508 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 2004) (neutral to hold arbitration hearings, mediate, and if necessary render an arbitration
award on the basis of last best offers on issues related to negotiation of collective bargaining
agreement); see also Dep’t of the Navy v. Local 22, IFPTE, 97 F.S.I.P. 100, 1997 WL
665055 (1997) (Carrillo, Arb.); Stipanowich, supra note 2, at 853-55, 869-70, 887 (discussing med-arb and related legal and practical issues).
In a related vein, mediators sometimes encourage parties to a mediated agreement to
include an arbitration clause in the agreement; the mediators themselves are sometimes designated as arbitrators in the clause. E.g., Fair v. Bakhtiari, 147 P.3d 653, 654-55 (Cal.
2006); Morgan Phillips, Inc. v. JAMS/Endispute, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 782 (Ct. App. 2006).
15 E.g., Soc’y of Lloyd’s v. Moore, No. 1:06-CV-286, 2006 WL 3167735, at *1 (S.D. Ohio
Nov. 1, 2006); see Michael Leathes et al., Einstein’s Lessons in Mediation, MANAGING
INTELL. PROP., July-Aug. 2006, at 23, available at http://www.managingip.com/Article.aspx
?ArticleID=1254352 (subscription required). Med-arb has been integrated in some institutional provisions and even in court rules. See, e.g., Clark v. Alfa Ins. Co., No. Civ.A. 00AR-3296-S, 2001 WL 34394281, at *4 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 7, 2001) (citing N.D. Ala. Loc. R.
16.1 with Med/Arb and other options).
16 See FOLBERG, GOLANN, KLOPPENBERG & STIPANOWICH, supra note 12, at 646 (citing
Township of Aberdeen v. Patrolmen’s Benevolent Ass’n, Local 163, 669 A.2d 291 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (holding that a med-arb neutral cannot apply information
obtained from mediation to the arbitral setting)).
17 See infra text accompanying notes 80-82, 86-117, 247-73; see also Stipanowich, supra
note 2, at 860-66.
18 IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION,
INTERNATIONALIZATION 172 (1992).
19 See generally Schmitz, supra note 2, at 1-2 (criticizing judicial tendencies to either rely
on arbitration law or deny enforcement to ADR agreements and calling for courts to develop
approaches to enforcement of ADR agreements under the law of contract).
20 The phrase is borrowed from K.N. LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE
WAY: CONFLICT AND CASE LAW IN PRIMITIVE JURISPRUDENCE 28 (1941) (noting recurring
issues that indicate the legal system’s problems and future direction).
21 See infra notes 25-85 and accompanying text.
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Part II will touch upon the diverse approaches taken by courts in determining
whether various “ADR” processes fall within the purview of arbitration law
and will explore the implications of expansive application of arbitration law in
such contexts.22 Part III will examine issues raised by the expanding use of
agreements for multi-step dispute resolution, including the legal implications of
a party’s refusal or failure to comply with an agreement to negotiate or mediate
prior to arbitration.23 Part IV will briefly consider various ways of advancing a
more rational legal framework for the evolving spectrum of diverse dispute
resolution mechanisms, with due consideration of the tension between the need
for appropriate legal structures and the importance of promoting party autonomy and flexibility in problem solving outside the legal system.24
I. ARBITRATION LAW: ITS FUNCTIONS, IMPACT,

AND

SCOPE

A. The Legal Framework
1. Functions of the FAA, State Arbitration Laws
In the United States, arbitration law consists of the Federal Arbitration Act
(“FAA”) and corresponding state statutes, the great majority of which are based
closely on the Uniform Arbitration Act (“UAA”) in its original 1955 form25 or
its revised version published in 2000 (“Revised UAA,” or “RUAA”).26 Federal
and state legislation is extensively fleshed out by judicial decisions; in the case
of the FAA, jurisprudence has had a dramatic impact on the scope and substance of the statutes.27
Arbitration law is aimed at regulating the interface between the private
forum of arbitration and the courts, with primary emphasis on the judicial
enforcement of agreements to arbitrate and of resulting arbitration awards.28
Arbitration law promotes the autonomy of parties by enforcing their agreements to arbitrate; in the case of the FAA this enforcement principle is very
strong and very broad,29 and the Supreme Court has decreed that it trumps
contrary state enactments.30 Arbitration law also serves channeling, eviden22

See infra notes 86-241 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 242-73 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 274-346 and accompanying text.
25 UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 1 (1956); see also The RUAA Moves Toward National Passage, DISP. RESOL. J., May-July 2002, at 5 (UAA ultimately adopted by 49 states).
26 RUAA, UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT (revised 2000); see also Association for Conflict Resolution, ACR Legislative and Public Policy (LPP) Committee Proposal on the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (Dec. 2005), http://acrnet.org/pdfs/RUAA_Proposal_for_ACR_
Member_Review_Comment_12-2005.pdf (RUAA adopted by at least eight states).
27 See generally 1 IAN R. MACNEIL, RICHARD E. SPIEDEL & THOMAS J. STIPANOWICH, FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS, AWARDS, AND REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL
ARBITRATION ACT (1994).
28 See FOLBERG , GOLANN, KLOPPENBERG & STIPANOWICH, supra note 12, at 518.
29 See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 23 n.27 (1983)
(“[T]he policy of the Arbitration Act requires a liberal reading of arbitration agreements . . . .”); see also Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967)
(holding that the scope of arbitrable issues should be decided in favor of arbitration).
30 See Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996) (holding that state regulation specifically limiting arbitration was preempted by the FAA); Allied-Bruce Terminix
Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995) (holding that FAA applies to any case “affecting”
23
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tiary, and cautionary functions31 by judicially enforcing only those agreements
evidenced by a writing or record,32 and against which no valid defense can be
asserted.33 Finally, it establishes supplementary or default terms for different
aspects of arbitration processes;34 in the case of the RUAA and some other
arbitration statutes, moreover, the law establishes certain principles or procedural elements that cannot be waived or modified by agreement.35
2. Potential Impact of Applying the FAA and State Arbitration Laws
The conclusion that a dispute resolution procedure is covered by the FAA
carries with it a number of specific consequences of legal import.36 It triggers
the operation of a judicial framework to ensure the specific performance of the
agreement to arbitrate and/or suspend litigation of the same disputes37—a
framework that ensures “special protection” for arbitration under federal law
and prohibits states from adopting anti-arbitration rules for contracts within the
scope of the FAA.38 It provides for prompt interlocutory review of judicial
decisions denying orders to compel arbitration pursuant to contractual provisions.39 It facilitates arbitration processes through mechanisms for judicial
appointment of arbitrators if the designated method fails,40 and for judicial
enforcement of arbitral summonses (subpoenas).41 It establishes mechanisms
for confirmation, modification, or vacatur of arbitrators’ decisions or awards,42
with standards for review that are “extremely deferential” to those decisions.43
Those standards do, however, incorporate notions of a “fundamentally fair”
adjudicative process,44 including the opportunity to present material evidence
before a decision maker who has made a timely disclosure of circumstances
that might call his or her impartiality into question.45 Arbitrators are deemed
interstate commerce); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (holding that FAA
applies in both federal and state courts).
31 Cf. LON L. FULLER & ROBERT BRAUCHER, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 557-58 (2d ed. 1964).
32 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
33 See id.
34 See., e.g., id. § 5 (providing for court-appointed arbitrator if established selection mechanisms fail).
35 RUAA, UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT § 4 (revised 2000) (prohibiting modification of provisional remedies, issuance of subpoenas and depositions, jurisdiction, etc.).
36 See Schmitz, supra note 2, at 5-14 (summarizing effects of FAA and UAA enforcement
schemes). As discussed below, some courts, in order to find certain kinds of dispute resolution processes are within the purview of the FAA, necessarily find one or more provisions of
the FAA inapposite. This is problematic. See infra text accompanying notes 108-10, 11618, 134-231.
37 2 MACNEIL, SPIEDEL & STIPANOWICH, supra note 27, §§ 15.1.3.1-.2.
38 Omni Tech Corp. v. MPC Solutions Sales, LLC, 432 F.3d 797, 799 (7th Cir. 2005).
39 FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 16(a) (2000); see Fit Tech, Inc. v. Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp.,
374 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2004).
40 9 U.S.C. § 5.
41 Id. § 7.
42 Id. §§ 9-10.
43 See Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 370 (3d Cir. 2003).
44 1 MACNEIL, SPIEDEL & STIPANOWICH, supra note 27, §§ 2.6.2-2.7; see also FOLBERG,
GOLANN, KLOPPENBERG & STIPANOWICH, supra note 12, at 568-69.
45 3 MACNEIL, SPIEDEL & STIPANOWICH, supra note 27, § 28.1.1.
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immune from judicial process within the scope of their arbitral role46 and will
not be called upon to testify in court proceedings save in special
circumstances.47
The 1955 version of the UAA is very similar in form and function. However, more recent revisions to that uniform law have produced a much
lengthier, more detailed and more prescriptive statutory framework for arbitration (RUAA), including a number of provisions setting forth default procedural
elements—some of which are non-waivable by parties. Much the same may be
said of the California Arbitration Act,48 which among other things contains
very specific disclosure requirements and other ethical standards for
arbitrators.49
3. Arbitration’s Consensual Foundations and Inherent Flexibility
Arbitration law is about enforcing consensual arrangements for private
dispute resolution, with a central tenet being effectuation of the intent of the
parties as expressed in their agreement.50 Within the ambit of the FAA and the
more prescriptive framework of some state arbitration statutes, therefore, parties are afforded considerable flexibility to structure processes as they see fit.
One leading scholar suggests that although arbitration is at once an “exercise of
private ordering” and “an exercise in adjudication—resulting in an award that
the force of the state makes obligatory on the litigants in much the same way as
[a court] judgment,” the fulfillment of the parties’ intent as defined by their
arbitration agreement is the dominant theme that both characterizes and distinguishes American arbitration.51
The principle of freedom to choose among procedural options suffuses
nearly all aspects of arbitration, and the wide arbitration spectrum includes a
considerably rich and diverse array of procedures. Arbitration law contemplates legal enforcement within broad bounds of agreements about the nature
and scope of arbitration, including the precise breadth of the arbitrator’s jurisdiction/authority, the selection of the tribunal, the character of the hearing, and
pre- and post-hearing procedure.52
Additional flexibility inheres in the ability of parties to agree to modify or
unilaterally waive elements of an agreed-upon process, even to the extent of
foregoing participation in a hearing.53 Moreover, it is commonly understood
that parties may agree to have an arbitrator enter the arbitral equivalent of a
consent order—an award based on terms of settlement crafted by the parties.54
46

See id. §§ 31.3.1.1-.2.
Id. § 31.3.1.6.
48 California Arbitration Act, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1280-1294.2 (West 2007).
49 Id. §§ 1297.121-.125 (prohibiting personal bias, conflict of interest, etc.).
50 1 MACNEIL, SPEIDEL & STIPANOWICH, supra note 27, § 3.2.1.1.
51 Alan Scott Rau, The Culture of American Arbitration and the Lessons of ADR, 40 TEX.
INT’L L.J. 449, 451 (2005).
52 3 MACNEIL, SPEIDEL & STIPANOWICH, supra note 27, § 27.2.
53 Id. § 32.4.2.1.
54 See China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (“CIETAC”) Arbitration Rules art. 40, § 1 (2005), available at http://www.cietac.org.cn/English/rules/rules.
htm (providing for an arbitration award based on settlement terms reached in mediation).
47
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All that said, in present practice consensual process choices (as well as
statutorily mandated dispute resolution programs) extend well beyond the
ambit of an adjudication resulting in a binding award, regularly challenging
courts to define what is and what is not within the contemplation of arbitration
law. Does arbitration law control if, for example, the agreement contemplates
that the “intervener” is intended to play the part of a mediator rather than an
adjudicative role,55 or that the intervener’s decision is not enforceable in a
court of law?56 What if the parties agree that there will be no hearing, but that
the intervener may make a binding determination on his or her own investigation?57 Each of these scenarios has provoked conflicting responses by courts.
A Tenth Circuit panel went so far as to say that “[p]arties need not establish quasi-judicial proceedings resolving their disputes to gain the protections
of the FAA, but may choose from a broad range of procedures and tailor arbitration to suit their peculiar circumstances.”58 This however, begs the essential
question—what, for the purposes of arbitration law, is “arbitration”?
B. What is “Arbitration”?
In 1925, Congress enacted the FAA to encourage judicial enforcement of
contractual arbitration provisions—or, in the words of the pivotal FAA section
2, “contract[s] . . . to settle [disputes] by arbitration,”59 offsetting the historic
“hostility of American courts” to their enforcement.60 In recent years, the
Supreme Court and other federal and state courts have repeatedly pronounced
strong federal policies supporting arbitration.61 As the Second Circuit recently
observed, “it is difficult to overstate the strong federal policy in favor of arbitration, and it is a policy we ‘have often and emphatically applied.’”62 These
policies are pragmatically reinforced by commensurate restrictions on the role
of courts in the management and disposition of arbitrable issues.63
Where the FAA holds sway to effectuate agreements to arbitrate, these
principles are sufficiently potent to trump policies supporting resort to otherwise popular process alternatives such as court-connected mediation.64 Con55

See infra text accompanying notes 139-79.
See infra text accompanying notes 180-231.
57 See infra text accompanying notes 232-241.
58 Salt Lake Tribune Publ’g Co. v. Mgmt. Planning, Inc., 390 F.3d 684, 690 (10th Cir.
2004).
59 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
60 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 111 (2001).
61 Id. at 131-32; Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24
(1983).
62 Arciniaga v. Gen. Motors Corp., 460 F.3d 231, 234 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Leadertex,
Inc. v. Morganton Dyeing & Finishing Corp., 67 F.3d 20, 25 (2d Cir. 1995)).
63 1 MACNEIL, SPEIDEL & STIPANOWICH, supra note 27, § 8.6; see also FOLBERG, GOLANN,
KLOPPENBERG & STIPANOWICH, supra note 12, at 526.
64 See generally In re Heritage Bldg. Sys., Inc., 185 S.W.3d 539, 542-43 (Tex. App. 2006)
(overturning an order postponing enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate pending the conclusion of court-ordered mediation). Despite arguments that strong state policies supported
the encouragement of settlement through mediation, the appeals panel unanimously concluded that deferring action on the motion to compel arbitration interfered with the parties’
expectations that their dispute would be addressed expeditiously through arbitration, and
would cause the parties additional delay and expense. Id. While mediation might occur, the
56

\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\8-1\NVJ118.txt

434

unknown

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

Seq: 8

17-JAN-08

9:52

[Vol. 8:427

versely, a determination that a particular dispute resolution procedure is not
“arbitration” means that a number of questions, including the ability of courts
to require participation in the process, to facilitate its implementation, or to
enforce its results, must be decided on other legal bases.65 These may be determinations of first impression, as may be questions about the confidentiality of
related communications, the immunity of the third party interveners or “neutrals” from legal process and their obligation to make disclosures about potential conflicts of interest.66 “When one of these powers or duties is important,”
in the words of Judge Easterbrook, “the choice between ‘arbitration’ and other
forms of private dispute resolution matters.”67 Some courts, moreover, have
concluded that if a procedure is not “arbitration,” there is no basis for judicial
enforcement.68
Given the legal consequences of the conclusion that a dispute resolution
process is or is not “arbitration,” one might logically expect the FAA to define
that term or otherwise delineate the purview of the FAA. Yet nowhere in the
FAA is there an explicit definition of the term “arbitration.”69 The legislative
history of the FAA provides no more illumination, at least directly.70
The same is true of the UAA, the highly influential template for state
arbitration statutes and close “cousin” to the FAA, which was revised by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (“NCCUSL”)
in 2000.71 The omission by NCCUSL drafters is particularly curious in light of
their inclusion of a glossary of terms in the Revised Uniform Act; they did,
however, offer relevant clues by defining “arbitrator” as “an individual
appointed to render an award, alone or with others, in a controversy that is
subject to an agreement to arbitrate.”72
Given the silence of the FAA and UAA regarding the definition of arbitration, coupled with the fact that federal and state statutes establish no formal
panel rejoined, it would have to be conducted within the rubric of “proceedings directed by
an arbitrator.” Id. at 543.
65 See Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 370 (3d Cir. 2003) (“If, however, a disputeresolution mechanism does not constitute arbitration under the FAA, then a district court has
no jurisdiction to review the result absent an independent jurisdictional hook.”).
66 See, e.g., id.
67 Omni Tech Corp. v. MPC Solutions Sales, LLC, 432 F.3d 797, 799 (7th Cir. 2005).
68 See Felkner v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 800 F.2d 1466, 1470 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding
that court would not enforce arbitration agreement that did not meet definition of arbitration); Johnson v. Mut. Serv. Cas. Ins. Co., 732 N.W.2d 340, 345 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007)
(holding that appraisal was not arbitration, and only a court action could determine an
insurer’s liability). But see Omni Tech Corp., 432 F.3d at 799 (fact that final, binding
accounting procedure is not “arbitration” does not mean it is not judicially enforceable).
69 1 MACNEIL, SPEIDEL & STIPANOWICH, supra note 27, § 2.3.1.1.
70 Id.
71 RUAA, UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT, prefatory note (revised 2000). As of this writing, the
Revised Uniform Arbitration Act had been passed by twelve states.
72 Id. § 1(2). The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration also
contains no true definition of the term “arbitration.” UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration art. 2(a) (amended 2006) Article 2(a) offers only a self-referring definition, explaining that under the Model Law “ ‘arbitration’ means any arbitration
whether or not administered by a permanent arbitral institution.” See id.
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requirement that arbitration agreements be explicitly identified as such,73 it is
incumbent upon courts to reach their own conclusions regarding the scope of
application of arbitration law. There are certainly strong clues in the overall
form and content of the statutes. Viewed in full, both the FAA and the UAA
appear to contemplate a process in which disputes are submitted to a hearing
before a third party, who renders a binding decision that fully and finally
addresses the disputes presented.74 Moreover, standards for vacatur of arbitral
decisions, or awards, envision some form of hearing before an impartial tribunal,75 as do provisions authorizing the issuance of summonses or subpoenas.76
From these indicators, reinforced by long custom and practice,77 some courts
have identified at least four “signifying elements” of procedures that, when
framed in an agreement, fall within the scope of arbitration law: (a) a process
to settle disputes between parties; (b) a neutral third party; (c) an opportunity
for the parties to be heard; and (d) a final, binding decision, or award, by the

73 See City of Omaha v. Omaha Water Co., 218 U.S. 180, 192 (1910); Fit Tech, Inc. v.
Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp., 374 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2004) (“Whether the accounting
remedy is ‘arbitration’ under the federal statute . . . does not depend on the nomenclature
used in the agreement.”); AMF, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 621 F. Supp. 456, 460 (E.D.N.Y.
1985). See generally 1 MACNEIL, SPEIDEL & STIPANOWICH, supra note 27, § 2.3.1.1, and
authorities cited therein.
74 See Schmitz, supra note 2, at 7. At least superficially, the language of the FAA raises a
question about whether or not “arbitration” may include nonbinding as well as binding
awards. FAA section 9 providing for judicial enforcement of awards states:

If the parties in their agreement have agreed that a judgment of the court shall be entered upon
the award made pursuant to the arbitration, and shall specify the court, then at any time within
one year after the award is made any party to the arbitration may apply to the court so specified
for an order confirming the award, and thereupon the court must grant such an order unless the
award is vacated, modified, or corrected as prescribed in sections 10 and 11 of this title.

Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2000) (emphasis added). The italicized phrase with
its conditional “if” might be interpreted as giving parties to agreements under the FAA an
option to provide for court enforcement of the award, failing which the judicial enforcement
provisions of the act would not apply.
However, there is no indication in the legislative history of the FAA that it was
designed to deal with anything but binding arbitration. Indeed, according to Professors Macneil, Speidel, and Stipanowich, “it was precisely the fear of nonbinding awards that led to the
need expressed in the House Report . . . ‘to make the contracting party live up to his agreement.’ ” See 1 MACNEIL, SPEIDEL & STIPANOWICH, supra note 27, § 9.8.1, at 9:57 (citing
MACNEIL, supra note 18, at chs. 7-9).
75 9 U.S.C. § 10 (a)(2) (award may be vacated in case of partiality or corruption).
76 Id. § 7 (describing process of summoning witnesses to testify before arbitrators).
77 Professor Soia Mentschikoff identified four “essential aspects” of arbitration: an agreement by parties to arbitrate; a dispute resolution process outside the courts; a decision by a
third party arbitrator; and recognition of that decision as final and binding in accordance with
the parties’ prior agreement. Soia Mentschikoff, The Significance of Arbitration—A Preliminary Inquiry, 17 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 698, 699 (1952).
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third party after the hearing.78 These elements denote what we will refer to as
“classic” arbitration for the purposes of comparison.79
Some federal and state courts, however, have applied arbitration law to
agreed procedures that in one way or another fail to conform to the “classic”
model, including processes in which there is no legally enforceable final
award80 or no hearing.81 These determinations are often made without explanation or on the basis of questionable, vague, and/or unreliable tests.82
Given what has been characterized as the irresistible “gravitational force”
of arbitration law—a body of well-established precedent according legitimacy,
strong protection, and expedited enforcement to arrangements for resolving
conflict—it is no wonder that many courts have swept aside “definitional niceties” and used arbitration law as a convenient (if often ill-fitting) hook for
enforcement of other kinds of dispute resolution agreements.83 Indeed, at least
one thoughtful scholar forcefully argues that the strong policies supporting
party autonomy require courts to apply arbitration law very liberally, affording
breathing room for the evolution of various forms of private ordering.84 There
are, however, countervailing arguments supporting a more restrained application of arbitration law and the promotion of appropriate alternative grounds for
the enforcement of nonbinding arbitration, mediation, and other alternatives to
“classic” arbitration.85

78

See, e.g., Fit Tech, 374 F.3d at 7. A California appellate decision explained:
Arbitration has been defined as “[a] process of dispute resolution in which a neutral third party
(arbitrator) renders a decision after a hearing at which both parties have an opportunity to be
heard.” The characteristics of an arbitration agreement are: “(1) a third party decision maker;
(2) a mechanism for ensuring neutrality with respect to the rendering of the decision; (3) a
decision maker who is chosen by the parties; (4) an opportunity for both parties to be heard, and
(5) a binding decision.”

Lindsay v. Lewandowski, 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846, 850 n.2 (Ct. App. 2006) (citation omitted)
(quoting Cheng-Canindin v. Renaissance Hotel Ass’n, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 867, 872 (Ct. App.
1996)); see also Bowden v. Weickert, No. S-02-017, 2003 WL 21419175, at *5 (Ohio Ct.
App. June 20, 2003) (quoting Ohio Council 8 v. Ohio Dep’t of Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabilities, 459 N.E.2d 220, 222 (Ohio 1984) (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1966))); 1 MACNEIL, SPEIDEL & STIPANOWICH, supra note 27,
§ 2.1.2; Mentschikoff, supra note 77; see also Amy J. Schmitz, Ending a Mud Bowl: Defining Arbitration’s Finality Through Functional Analysis, 37 GA. L. REV. 123, 125 (2002)
(observing that “most have read the [arbitration] acts to apply to consensual proceedings that
‘settle’ or end disputes through final and binding third party determinations”).
79 Fit Tech, 374 F.3d at 7 (referring to “classic arbitration” elements).
80 See infra note 135 and accompanying text.
81 See infra notes 106, 111, 115 and accompanying text.
82 See infra notes 106, 111, 115 and accompanying text.
83 See Rau, supra note 51, at 467.
84 See id. at 466-508.
85 See infra notes 134-241.
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II. JUDICIAL DIVERGENCE ON THE APPLICATION OF ARBITRATION
LAW TO DISPUTE RESOLUTION AGREEMENTS
A. The Scope of Arbitration Law: A Variety of Approaches
Courts have taken dramatically different approaches in assessing the applicability of arbitration law to various conflict resolution processes.86 While
some have concluded that only “classic” arbitration is within the scope of the
statute, others have applied arbitration law to agreements for “nonbinding arbitration,” appraisal,87 or other nonbinding third-party decision-making
processes88 and even to mediation.89
Under the FAA, divergence begins with the question of whether the definition of arbitration is a matter of federal or state law.90 In determining
whether a contract requires arbitration, the Supreme Court has decreed,
“[C]ourts generally . . . should apply ordinary state-law principles that govern
the formation of contracts.”91 This has led a number of courts to look to state
law in order to determine whether the FAA applies to a dispute resolution
agreement.92 Other decisions have rejected this approach, however, citing the
absence of plain evidence that Congress intended state law to define “arbitration”93 and the declared national policy supporting the broad enforceability of
86

There is a good deal of authority for the proposition that the application of the FAA does
not depend on precise nomenclature and that arbitration law may be applicable to agreements contemplating processes not expressly labeled “arbitration.” See Fit Tech, Inc. v.
Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp., 374 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2004). See generally 1 MACNEIL,
SPEIDEL & STIPANOWICH, supra note 27, §§ 2.3.1-.2, and authorities cited therein.
87 See infra notes 192-97 and accompanying text.
88 See infra notes 180-91 and accompanying text.
89 See infra notes 100, 110, 140 and accompanying text.
90 See 1 MACNEIL, SPEIDEL & STIPANOWICH, supra note 27, § 2.3.1.2.
91 First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995).
92 See, e.g., Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. U.S. Bank Trust Nat’l Ass’n, 218 F.3d 1085, 109091 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that state law governed review of appraisal decision); Hartford
Lloyd’s Ins. Co. v. Teachworth, 898 F.2d 1058, 1062-63 (5th Cir. 1990) (defining arbitration
per Texas and other state laws); Wasyl, Inc. v. First Boston Corp., 813 F.2d 1579, 1582 (9th
Cir. 1987) (defining “arbitration” by reference to state law).
93 A Tenth Circuit panel reasoned:
In the absence of clear evidence that Congress intended state law to define “arbitration,” we
must assume that federal law provides the definition. The meaning that the law attaches to the
term “arbitration” establishes the scope and force of the FAA. Unless Congress plainly intended
the various states’ laws to define “arbitration,” and to therefore regulate the FAA’s application
within their borders, we will look to federal law for the definition. See Mississippi Band of
Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 43, 109 S. Ct. 1597, 104 L.Ed.2d 29 (1989) (“We
start . . . with the general assumption that in the absence of a plain indication to the contrary,
Congress when it enacts a statute is not making the application of the federal act dependent on
state law.”) (internal citations omitted). . . .
Neither the language nor the legislative history of the FAA demonstrate that Congress
plainly intended state law to define the FAA’s central term. Not only does the FAA lack a plain
indication that state law should govern, it is silent as to what law defines “arbitration.” . . .
....
Congress did not plainly intend arbitration to mean different things in different states.
Rather, it sought a uniform federal policy favoring agreements to arbitrate. Accordingly, we will
apply federal law standards to determine whether . . . appraisal constituted arbitration.
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agreements to arbitrate under the FAA requiring a single national definition of
“arbitration.”94
Putting aside the question of controlling law, there is the central problem
of finding a suitable, functional test for application of arbitration law. A survey
of pertinent case law reveals fundamental conflict among judicial approaches.
Fit Tech, Inc. v. Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. 95 is illustrative of
precedents that base decisions about whether a process falls within the ambit of
arbitration law on its conformance to the “classic” or traditional model of arbitration, based in turn on the “intuited” intent of statutory drafters.96 The First
Circuit decision concerned an agreement to have Price Waterhouse accountants
make a final determination of disputes regarding the calculation of the corporate earnings of fitness centers. The court drew attention to the language of
finality in the agreement as well as the presence of “other common incidents of
arbitration of a contractual dispute” including “an independent adjudicator,”
standards for decision-making (in the form of terms governing the pay-out),
and “an opportunity for each side to present its case.”97
Some other decisions apply arbitration law to various dispute resolution
processes without explanation. In Dow Corning Corp. v. Safety National Casualty Corp.,98 an Eighth Circuit panel determined that the FAA was applicable
to arbitration procedures culminating in what it concluded must be a nonbinding decision;99 it reached this conclusion without pertinent consideration of the
nature and purpose of the FAA or any other supporting justification. In Cecala
v. Moore,100 a federal district court enforced a “mediation” agreement under
the Illinois Uniform Arbitration Act, using the terms “arbitration” and “mediaSalt Lake Tribune Publ’g Co. v. Mgmt. Planning, Inc., 390 F.3d 684, 688-89 (10th Cir.
2004).
94 See Fit Tech, Inc. v. Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp., 374 F.3d 1, 6 & n.3 (1st Cir.
2004) (pointing out analogous examples of core terms at the heart of various federal statutory schemes being defined as a matter of federal law). As stated in Salt Lake Tribune:
“Were we to hold that state law guides our determination, we would empower states to
define arbitration as they choose, thus limiting the FAA’s utility. This we decline to do.
Congress passed the FAA to ensure that state law would not undermine arbitration
agreements.”
Salt Lake Tribune, 390 F.3d at 689.
95 Fit Tech, 374 F.3d 1.
96 See id. The decision reasoned that the applicability of the FAA to an “accounting remedy” should be based on “how closely the specified procedure resembles classic arbitration
and whether treating the procedure as arbitration serves the intuited purposes of Congress.”
Id. at 7.
97 Id. The court noted that although the “accounting remedy” did not cover all of the disputes between the parties, including operational issues affecting the pay-out, there was no
requirement that arbitration provide comprehensive relief. Id. (citing Coady v. Ashcraft &
Gerel, 223 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2000); McDonnell Douglas Fin. Corp. v. Pa. Power & Light
Co., 858 F.2d 825, 831-33 (2d Cir. 1988)).
98 Dow Corning Corp. v. Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 335 F.3d 742 (8th Cir. 2003).
99 Id. at 747; see also Safety Nat’l Cas. Co. v. Cinergy Corp., 829 N.E.2d 986 (Ind. Ct. App.
2005) (concluding “arbitration” agreement was enforceable under Indiana law without concluding whether the arbitral decision would or would not be binding). Cf. Wolsey, Ltd. v.
Foodmaker, Inc., 144 F.3d 1205, 1208-09 (9th Cir. 1998).
100 Cecala v. Moore, 982 F. Supp. 609 (N.D. Ill. 1997).

\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\8-1\NVJ118.txt

Fall 2007]

unknown

Seq: 13

THE ARBITRATION PENUMBRA

17-JAN-08

9:52

439

tion” interchangeably; the court appeared to be oblivious to the differences
between the processes.
A middle (and muddy) ground is occupied by other precedents, most notably the much-cited federal district court decision in AMF Inc. v. Brunswick
Corp. and its progeny.101 AMF centers upon the language of FAA section 2
providing that the arbitration statute governs “contracts . . . to settle [disputes]
by arbitration.”102 For the purposes of applying the FAA, the court reasoned,
the key issue was “whether ‘a controversy’ would be ‘settled’ by the process
set forth in the agreement” as required by section 2.103 This, the court concluded, did not mandate the rendition of a legally enforceable award. Although
the subject agreement to submit disputes regarding advertised claims to the
National Advertising Division (“NAD”) provided for the NAD to make a determination that was not legally binding, the court concluded that the parties’ controversy would nevertheless be “settled” by the NAD procedure because there
would be a determination as to whether data supported the advertised claims—
“even though the parties [might] want to continue related disputes in another
forum.”104 Given the history of corporate adherence to decisions issued by
NAD tribunals, moreover, it was “highly likely” that a NAD determination
would either end the challenge to the advertisement or result in a modification
of the advertising copy.105 In a further departure from the “classic” arbitration
model, the court ruled that the FAA applied despite the fact that NAD procedures did not involve an adversary hearing, but were based on ex parte
communications.106
AMF has had considerable influence on judicial opinions, including federal appellate decisions addressing enforcement of nonbinding arbitration provisions.107 This is regrettable since the AMF rationale lends itself to subjective
101

AMF Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 621 F. Supp. 456 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
103 AMF, 621 F. Supp. at 459.
104 Id. at 461.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 In Wolsey, Ltd. v. Foodmaker, Inc., 144 F.3d 1205 (9th Cir. 1998), the Ninth Circuit
favorably cited AMF in the course of directing the enforcement of a nonbinding arbitration
provision in a restaurant franchise development agreement. Id. at 1208-09. The court, however, dispensed with any consideration of the likelihood that the nonbinding determination
would finally resolve any of the issues and in this sense went a significant step beyond AMF.
See id. at 1209. In United States v. Bankers Insurance Co., 245 F.3d 315 (4th Cir. 2001),
AMF and Wolsey were favorably cited by the Fourth Circuit in support of its determination
that an arbitration agreement was enforceable under the FAA despite the fact that it was not
binding on the United States Government. Id. at 321-23. In Brennan v. King, 139 F.3d 258
(1st Cir. 1998), the court distinguished the facts of AMF in the course of declining to apply
the FAA to an “arbitration” provision in a university tenure application procedure, concluding that “[b]ecause the contract at issue here imposes strict constraints on the scope of the
arbitrator’s authority and severely limits the effect of the arbitral decision, there is little
ground for a “reasonable . . . expectation” that the procedure will resolve the dispute.” Id. at
266 n.7 (quoting Harrison v. Nissan Motor Corp., 111 F.3d 343, 350 (3d Cir. 1997)).
In Kelley v. Benchmark Homes, Inc., 550 N.W.2d 640 (Neb. 1996), the court also cited
AMF in support of its conclusion that the Federal Arbitration Act covers nonbinding arbitration agreements. Id. at 645. The Alabama Supreme Court made no distinction between
binding and nonbinding arbitration in Morrison Restaurants v. Homestead Village of Fair102
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and time-consuming inquiries into whether a particular process is “reasonably
likely” to resolve a dispute, thus invoking arbitration law. The resulting difficulty is exemplified by Harrison v. Nissan Motor Corp.,108 a case in which the
trial court was treated to a lawyerly debate over the extent to which a manufacturer’s informal dispute resolution mechanisms actually avoided resort to
court.109 It does not require a great stretch of the imagination to imagine courts
being asked to apply arbitration law to a mediation proceeding under the AMF
standard because the designated mediator (or mediation provider organization)
boasts a high rate of success in closing cases! Indeed, even without resort to
such arguments, the rationale promoted by AMF has underpinned judicial
enforcement of agreements to mediate under arbitration law.110
Other decisions also appear to have departed from the “classic arbitration”
approach, raising the possibility that processes not based on an adversary hearing are within the scope of arbitration law.111 Consider the Tenth Circuit’s
decision in Salt Lake Tribune Publishing Co. v. Management Planning, Inc. 112
While the court observed that “[u]nder federal law, we must determine if the
process at issue sufficiently resembles classic arbitration to fall within the purview of the FAA,” it focused solely on what it termed the “central [element of]
any conception of classic arbitration[:] . . . the disputants empowered a third
party to render a decision settling their dispute.”113 In accompanying dicta the
court observed that “[p]arties need not establish quasi-judicial proceedings
resolving their disputes to gain the protections of the FAA, but may choose
from a broad range of procedures and tailor arbitration to suit their peculiar
hope Ltd., 710 So. 2d 905 (Ala. 1998). The court invoked the principle “a party may waive
its right to arbitrate a dispute if it substantially invokes the litigation process and thereby
substantially prejudices the party opposing arbitration” to strike down a clause in a food
service contract calling for mediation of disputes, followed by nonbinding arbitration if
mediation failed to resolve disputes. Id. at 907 (internal quotations omitted).
108 Harrison, 111 F.3d 343.
109 Id. at 350.
110 In CB Richard Ellis, Inc. v. American Environmental Waste Management, No. 98-CV4183 (JG), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20064 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 1998), the court also rigorously
applied the FAA to enforce a mediation agreement, citing policies and precedents supporting
the broad enforceability of arbitration agreements and standards for interpretation. The court
endorsed the parties’ position that the FAA governed judicial analysis of the mediation provision, reasoning that because the clause “manifests the parties’ intent to provide an alternative method to ‘settle’ controversies arising under [their agreement, it] fits within the
[FAA’s] definition of arbitration.” Id. at *4 (citing AMF, 621 F. Supp. 456). This rationale
would extend the purview of the FAA to virtually any ADR process. Accord Fisher v. GE
Med. Sys., 276 F. Supp. 2d 891 (M.D. Tenn. 2003).
111 See AMF, 621 F. Supp. 456.
112 Salt Lake Tribune Publ’g Co. v. Mgmt. Planning, Inc., 390 F.3d 684 (10th Cir. 2004).
113 Id. at 689 (citing Harrison, F.3d at 350). The court was emphatic that it “must nonetheless scrutinize the process . . . to ascertain whether the third party’s decision does in fact
resolve the dispute.” Id. at 690. It cited McDonnell Douglas Finance Corp. v. Pennsylvania
Power & Light Co., 858 F.2d 825, 830 (2d Cir. 1988), for the principle that “what is important is [whether] the parties clearly intended to submit some disputes to their chosen instrument for the definitive settlement of grievances under the Agreement.” Salt Lake Tribune,
390 F.3d at 690. The court cites 1 MACNEIL, SPIEDEL & STIPANOWICH, supra note 27,
§ 2.3.1.1. Salt Lake Tribune, 390 F.3d at 690 (“Process is arbitration under the FAA where
‘the decision of the dispute resolver shall be both final and binding, subject only to the
limited judicial review spelled out in the FAA.’ ”).
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circumstances.”114 Although the Tenth Circuit’s vague insistence that arbitration need not involve “quasi-judicial proceedings” may or may not constitute
an outright rejection of the requirement of the adversary hearings that are an
element of “classic” arbitration, other courts have clearly held that an agreement to conduct hearings is not a prerequisite to the application of arbitration
law.115
In addition to revealing considerable judicial confusion, not to mention
sloppiness,116 many of the decisions applying arbitration law to mediation and
nonbinding arbitration processes raise important questions. Given that arbitration law provides a convenient procedural “hook” for the bare enforcement of
other kinds of dispute resolution provisions, one may ask, what of the applicability of other aspects of arbitration law? As discussed above, arbitration law
not only establishes a procedure for requiring people to participate in a process,
but also establishes a multi-faceted implementing legal framework.117 Of
necessity, courts that summarily enforce other kinds of ADR agreements under
arbitration law must use federal and state statutes selectively since at least some
(and perhaps many) sections of the statute may be inapposite. Assuming this is
permissible, are courts up to the challenge? And are there not more suitable
alternatives?
B. Exploding the Box: The Case for Expansive, Flexible Application of
Arbitration Law
Professor Alan Rau has advanced creative arguments in support of the
notion that arbitration law should serve as a fount of “living law” of dispute
resolution and evolve expansively to serve a wide range of public and private
intervention processes.118 He contends that American arbitration law represents a duality119 in which, in contrast to judicial approaches in other systems,120 the notion of a legally enforceable adjudication mechanism in place of
the public forum is of much less significance than the principle of party autonomy in private ordering.121 This consummate emphasis on the ability of parties
to structure private dispute resolution processes in virtually any way they
choose has resulted in enforcement of agreements that circumvent most if not
all elements we have termed “classic arbitration”122 and present conceptual difficulties for those seeking to assert firm boundaries for arbitration law.
Limiting the application of arbitration law to circumstances in which an
adversary hearing is conducted, or where a legally binding award is rendered,
he argues, creates a “straitjacket” that unduly restricts the flexibility already
114

Salt Lake Tribune, 390 F.3d at 690.
See, e.g., Schofield v. Int’l Dev. Group Co., No. SA-05-CA-1110-RF, 2006 WL 504058,
at *2 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 2, 2006) (citing definition of “arbitration” in Black’s Law Dictionary);
AMF, 621 F. Supp. 456.
116 See generally Rau, supra note 51.
117 See supra text accompanying notes 25-49.
118 See generally Rau, supra note 51, at 466-508.
119 Nathan Isaacs may have been the first to comment upon the dual character of arbitration.
Nathan Isaacs, Two Views of Commercial Arbitration, 40 HARV. L. REV. 929 (1927).
120 See generally, Rau, supra note 51.
121 See id.
122 See supra text accompanying notes 77-79.
115
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inhering in parties under arbitration law.123 In order for arbitration to have
sufficient breathing space to serve the wide ranging needs of contracting parties, courts should be prepared to transcend any traditional boundaries.124 In
addition, he suggests, arbitration law is not an all-or-nothing unitary construct,
but rather a smorgasbord that parties and courts may selectively apply to the
extent circumstances warrant.125 He proposes that courts be permitted to use
the act as a source of enlightened statute-based commercial law,126 “lett[ing it]
out” as necessary to address present realities.127
On this basis, Professor Rau proposes to explode any conceptual “box” for
arbitration and apply arbitration law to forms of nonbinding arbitration and
third party decision-making, and even mediation—whether consensual or statutorily mandated. He eschews virtually every definitional boundary for arbitration, save the need (apparently) for a third party intervener in some role.128
(He merely offers a list of scenarios that he says are clearly beyond the scope of
arbitration law.129)
Rau contends that harnessing the “core” aspects of arbitration law, including sections authorizing courts to stay related litigation and compel arbitration
and to appoint arbitrators (neutrals)130 to enforce various mediation agreements
and other ADR provisions, would give authors of mediation and nonbinding
decision-making processes the benefit of the “streamlined procedures” and
“expedited judicial action” to enforce their agreements.131 Other aspects of
arbitration law, including provisions for confirmation and vacatur, might or
might not be applicable depending on the circumstances. In the case of vacatur
standards, for example, it would be up to the courts to “assure the conclusive
123

Rau, supra note 51, at 501. “To look for the ‘ideal type’ of a particular process is to
miss the obvious point that the needs of contracting parties, and the creativity of draftsmen,
are infinite in their variety—as are the types of dispute resolution mechanisms that they may
devise.” Id. at 504.
124 Id.
125 Id. Lending weight to Professor Rau’s position are decisions in which courts acknowledge the possibility that an arbitration agreement may be enforced even though the final
award may not be enforceable in a court of law. See, e.g., Dow Corning Corp. v. Safety
Nat’l Cas. Corp., 335 F.3d 742, 745 (8th Cir. 2003) (distinguishing “[m]andatory arbitration
prior to resort to a court” from “mandatory arbitration precluding resort to a court”); Orlando
v. Interstate Container Corp., 100 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 1996); Okla. City Assocs. v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 923 F.2d 791, 795 (10th Cir. 1991). As Professor Schmitz explains, “If the
parties do not agree that judgment may be entered on an award, the FAA does not apply to
the enforcement of the award. [But] [i]f the FAA applies to the proceeding, the parties may
enjoy other benefits of the broad remedial scheme of the Act . . . .” Schmitz, supra note 78,
at 147. Professor Macneil, however, strongly disputes this notion and insists that the FAA
should be read to permit judicial enforcement of awards in the absence of an entry of judgment clause. He insists that the language and legislative history of the Act support this
conclusion. In any event, he insists, awards rendered in the absence of an entry of judgment
clause should be enforceable in an “ordinary [common law] action on the award.” 4 MACNEIL, SPIEDEL & STIPANOWICH, supra note 27, § 38.2.2.
126 See Rau, supra note 51, at 469-70.
127 Id. at 503.
128 Id. at 460-61.
129 See generally Rau, supra note 51.
130 Id. at 500.
131 Id. Rau suggests that to deny them this opportunity “seems both ungenerous and unnecessary.” Id.
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nature of an award only to the extent this is what the parties were trying to
accomplish.”132 He is apparently confident that courts will be able to navigate
their way to nuanced, tailored applications of federal or state arbitration statutes
that are appropriate to the procedures at hand.133
C. Arguments for Greater Restraint
There is no question that parties have created an extraordinarily rich spectrum of dispute resolution processes, many of which are “one-off” from classic
arbitration. Moreover, parties routinely modify or waive procedural elements
(by, for example, foregoing the opportunity to present evidence in an adversary
hearing134 or limiting the “finality” of an award135). Although in recent years
there have been a spate of judicial or legislative efforts to set limits on this
flexibility by, for example, establishing mandatory and non-waivable rules for
arbitration136 or forbidding certain kinds of agreements such as contractually
expanded standards for judicial review and vacatur of award,137 the principle of
contractual autonomy and flexibility is a strong argument for a liberal interpretation of what constitutes “arbitration.”138
There are, however, a number of compelling arguments for not applying
arbitration law indiscriminately to other forms of ADR agreements, including
the lack of functional compatibility between these processes and the language
and structure of the arbitration statutes, related transaction costs, and the availability (or possibility) of more suitable alternatives. We will first consider mediation, and then turn to nonbinding arbitration and other forms of nonbinding
third-party decision-making.
1. Mediation and the Law of Arbitration
As we have seen, some courts have enforced agreements to mediate (under
which a third party facilitates negotiations between the parties in order to pro132

Id. at 501 (emphasis omitted).
Id.
134 See supra text accompanying note 53.
135 See Harris v. Parker Coll. of Chiropractic, 286 F.3d 790, 793-94 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding
that parties’ contractual modification of default standard of review for arbitration awards
allowed for de novo review of pure questions of law); Gateway Techs., Inc. v. MCI Tellecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 996-97 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that when parties’ contract
stated that errors of law in arbitration decision shall be subject to appeal, de novo review of
issues of law was embodied in the arbitration award).
136 See supra text accompanying notes 35, 49.
137 See, e.g., Schoch v. InfoUSA, Inc., 341 F.3d 785, 789 n.3 (8th Cir. 2003) (“[W]e again
express skepticism as to whether parties can contract for heightened judicial review of arbitration awards, which would seemingly amend the FAA, crown arbitrators mini-district
courts, force federal trial courts to sit as appellate courts, and completely transform the
nature of arbitration and judicial review.”); Chi. Typographical Union No. 16 v. Chi. SunTimes Inc., 935 F.2d 1501, 1505 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that the parties cannot contract for
judicial review of an arbitration award); Oakland-Alameda County Coliseum Auth. v. CC
Partners, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 363, 370 (Ct. App. 2002) (holding that parties to an arbitration
agreement cannot contractually expand the scope of judicial review beyond that provided by
statute).
138 See supra text accompanying notes 50-54.
133
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mote resolution of dispute)139 under federal or state arbitration law, either without explanation140 or under broad interpretations of the scope of the relevant
statute.141 Such actions, however, defy even the most strained interpretation of
the nature and purposes of arbitration law. There is absolutely no evidence that
agreements to mediate were within the contemplation of the drafters, and there
is recent evidence to the contrary in the form of discrete uniform law initiatives
on arbitration and mediation.142 Moreover, no prudent practitioner purporting
to advise clients on the drafting of dispute resolution clauses would assume that
a mediation provision would be governed by arbitration law.143
Let us consider the fundamental difference between an agreement to mediate and an agreement to arbitrate. Parties pen an arbitration clause with the
expectation that their efforts to resolve the subject controversies will be wholly
(or almost wholly) outside the court system, and expect that resorting to court,
if required, will be limited to seeking some form of judicial facilitation for the
agreement or a resulting award; in the absence of voluntary compliance the law
provides a straightforward and expeditious means of getting to the anticipated
private forum and enforcing the bargained-for result. In the case of an agreement to mediate, the parties are conveying their intent to sit down at a table and
informally explore opportunities for consensual resolution; it is doubtful that
the legal enforceability of the provision is prominent in their minds—the
emphasis is on voluntary participation.144
139

See supra notes 100, 110.
See Cecala v. Moore, 982 F. Supp. 609, 612 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (applying Illinois Uniform
Arbitration Act); Design Benefit Plans, Inc. v. Enright, 940 F. Supp. 200 (N.D. Ill. 1996)
(enforcing contract provision requiring mediation, then arbitration, under Federal Arbitration
Act).
141 See Fisher v. GE Med. Sys., 276 F. Supp. 2d 891 (M.D. Tenn. 2003); Ellis v. Am. Envtl.
Waste Mgmt., No. 98-CV-4183 (JG), 1998 U.S. Dist LEXIS 20064 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 1998)
(applying Federal Arbitration Act).
In Coburn v. Grabowski, No. CV 960134935, 1997 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1478 (Conn.
Super. Ct. May 29, 1997), a Connecticut court reasoned that in the absence of cases involving the effect of mediation clauses, it was reasonable to look to the law of arbitration for
guidance in considering the enforceability of a mediation provision in a real estate contract.
The court observed that “[a]lthough the mediation process differs from the arbitration process, they are both accepted methods utilized for dispute resolution . . . [and] the types of
clauses found in contracts invoking their use are generally similar.” Id. at *3. Although this
approach is similar to the way courts use the Uniform Commercial Code by analogy to fill
gaps in non-U.C.C. commercial and contract law, the U.C.C. expressly envisages this
approach while arbitration statutes do not. U.C.C. § 1-102 (1998).
142 The effort by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(“NCCUSL”) to modify the Uniform Arbitration Act occurred simultaneously with the drafting of the Uniform Mediation Act by a separate committee under NCCUSL auspices. See
RUAA, UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT (revised 2000); see also UNIF. MEDIATION ACT (2001).
NCCUSL’s Scope and Program Committee rejected a proposal to include provisions in
the Uniform Arbitration Act to provide for summary enforcement of agreements to mediate.
Schmitz, supra note 2, at 12.
143 One of the few exceptions is the referral to arbitration of an issue respecting the impact
of a failure to mediate in a multi-step dispute resolution provision. See infra text accompanying notes 242-48.
144 Suzanne J. Schmitz, A Critique of the Illinois Circuit Rules Concerning Court-Ordered
Mediation, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 783, 787 (2005) (summarizing common critiques of courtordered mediation); Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in Court140
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In almost every way, the “enforcement” of an agreement to mediate under
the FAA or corresponding arbitration law makes no sense because the
processes are fundamentally incompatible in nature and purpose. The specific
enforcement of an agreement to mediate typically consists of an order to participate in a negotiation presided over by a mediator.145 The obligation may
result in attendance at no more than a single meeting,146 and pending litigation
may be suspended only briefly. In contrast to binding arbitration, “there is no
wholesale substitution of private process for public, only the contingency that a
negotiated settlement will end some or all of the litigation.”147 Mediation,
unlike binding arbitration, is truly conducted “in the shadow of the
courthouse.”148
The process implicitly defined by the FAA and state arbitration statutes
and fleshed out by courts is a private adjudicative framework that is in virtually
all respects an analog of the public justice system.149 The parties have consigned the resolution of their dispute to the good offices of the arbitrator for full
and final resolution; the arbitrator as judge and jury has plenary authority over
all aspects of the proceedings, subject only to the parties’ agreement and the
demands of fundamental fairness. The law empowers arbitrators to issue subpoenas for documents and witnesses,150 direct hearing schedules, control the
flow of evidence,151 and decide all submitted issues. As in court, ex parte
discussions generally must be avoided in the interest of fairness.152
In contrast, mediation is intended to promote self-determination by engaging the parties in facilitated communications that may lead to a negotiated settlement.153 As facilitators, mediators are habitually accorded none of the quasijudicial powers of arbitrators, and in the absence of novel arrangements it
would be anomalous for a mediator to issue subpoenas or make legally enforceable rulings. Mediators’ power lies in their ability to listen, to promote communication, and to persuade.154 The opportunity to communicate in confidence
with the parties, ex parte, is often critical to their success.
Connected Mediation: The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization?, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L.
REV. 1 (2001).
145 See Monroe v. Corpus Christi Indep. Sch. Dist., 236 F.R.D. 320 (S.D. Tex. 2006); Valley Coal Co. v. Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am., 586 A.2d 436 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1991).
146 See, e.g., Envtl. Contractors, LLC v. Moon, 983 P.2d 390 (Mont. 1999) (finding that
dismissal of appeal was not warranted where party satisfied appellate mediation participation
requirements by being available by telephone and having his attorney physically present at a
single mediation meeting).
147 Stipanowich, supra note 2, at 862.
148 Exceptions must be made for mediations conducted pursuant to multi-step dispute resolution provisions in which disputes that are not resolved through mediation are submitted to
arbitration. Some related issues are discussed in Part III. See infra text accompanying notes
242-73.
149 FOLBERG, GOLANN, KLOPPENBERG & STIPANOWICH, supra note 12, at 453.
150 See 3 MACNEIL, SPIEDEL & STIPANOWICH, supra note 27, § 34.2.1.
151 Id. § 34.2.
152 Id. § 32.4.1.2.
153 Welsh, supra note 144, at 4.
154 See id.
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The immunity of arbitrators from liability within their arbitral role is well
established under U.S. law,155 as reflected in the latest revisions to the UAA.156
Arbitral immunity is based on the notion that arbitrators, like judges, require
protection from liability and legal process in order to ensure their impartiality
and shield them from undue influence in making decisions.157 It also reflects
strong public policies against judicial intrusion into the arbitration process and
in favor of the finality of arbitration awards.158 However, the immunity of
mediators is another (and more controversial) matter;159 arbitral immunity furnishes no obvious predicate,160 with the possible exceptions of mediators with
close connections to courts161 or mediators who render formal advisory opinions or evaluations.162 Although some statutes have offered similar protections
to court-appointed mediators,163 the drafters of the Uniform Mediation Act
(“UMA”) declined the opportunity to include a provision for mediator
immunity.164
A comparison of the recent uniform statutes points to another salient difference in mediation and arbitration—the nature and scope of confidentiality.165 The centrality of confidentiality in mediation is reflected in the UMA,
which is devoted almost entirely to the scope of legal privileges for protection
of communications in mediation in order to facilitate full and forthright discourse between disputants and mediators.166 Despite its vaunted “privacy,”167
155

See generally 3 MACNEIL, SPIEDEL & STIPANOWICH, supra note 27, § 31.3.
RUAA, UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 14 (revised 2000). Internationally, practices vary.
See Stipanowich, supra note 2, at 878-79.
157 See 3 MACNEIL, SPIEDEL & STIPANOWICH, supra note 27, §§ 31.3.1.1-.2.
158 Id.
159 See SARAH R. COLE, NANCY H. ROGERS & CRAIG A. MCEWEN, MEDIATION: LAW,
POLICY & PRACTICE § 11.3 (2d ed. 2006); Cassondra E. Joseph, The Scope of Mediator
Immunity: When Mediators Can Invoke Absolute Immunity, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL.
629 (1997).
160 See Stipanowich, supra note 2, at 863.
161 See, e.g., Wagshal v. Foster, 28 F.3d 1249, 1252-54 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that absolute quasi-judicial immunity extends to mediators and case evaluators in court program); In
re Sergeant Farms, Inc., 224 B.R. 842 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1998) (holding that absolute quasijudicial immunity applies to mediator appointed in bankruptcy case).
162 See Wagshal v. Foster, 28 F.3d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that a court-appointed
mediator or neutral case evaluator performing tasks within the scope of his official duties
was entitled to absolute immunity from damages in a suit brought by a disappointed litigant);
Howard v. Drapkin, 271 Cal. Rptr. 893, 903 (Ct. App. 1990) (granting absolute immunity to
neutral third persons who are engaged as case evaluators or arbitrators when acting in their
official capacities).
163 E.g., FLA. STAT. § 44.107 (2007) (“[A court-appointed] mediator shall have judicial
immunity in the same manner and to the same extent as a judge.”).
164 See generally UNIF. MEDIATION ACT (2001); see also UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 4(b)
(Draft 1999), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/mediat/med499.pdf
(“This Draft takes no position on the general issue of immunity for mediators.”).
165 See generally Richard C. Reuben, Confidentiality in Arbitration: Beyond the Myth, 54
U. KAN. L. REV. 1255 (2006).
166 See generally UNIF. MEDIATION ACT. See, e.g., Fair v. Bakhtiari, 147 P.3d 653, 656-57
(Cal. 2006) (“[T]he mediation confidentiality provisions of the Evidence Code were enacted
to encourage mediation by permitting the parties to frankly exchange views, without fear that
disclosures might be used against them in later proceedings.”).
167 Reuben, supra note 165, at 1259-61.
156
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however, in the absence of special agreements or arbitral orders, arbitration
proceedings do not offer a similar evidentiary shield.168
Finally, arbitration statutes establish a framework for judicial confirmation, vacatur, modification, and enforcement of arbitrators’ decisions or awards.
The statutory framework clearly contemplates a judgment rendered through
adversary adjudication, not a settlement agreement achieved through facilitated
negotiation.169 Moreover, the law anticipates that the arbitral award will produce a full and final resolution of all matters submitted and—if the parties have
so provided, the enforcement of the final award by a court of law;170 in contrast, there is no guarantee that mediation will resolve any disputes, only a
possibility; in many cases, moreover, mediated settlements resolve some but
not all of the issues.171
Thus, the law of arbitration is in nearly every respect an illogical foundation for enforcement of mediation agreements.172 Although a desperate lawyer
or ill-informed court may use arbitration law as a convenient hook for ordering
parties to mediation, it means forcing a square peg into a round hole.
2. Other Grounds for Enforcement of Mediation Provisions
That said, there are several other bases upon which courts may enforce
agreements to mediate. In some jurisdictions, for example, statutes now provide a specific rubric for enforcement of mediation agreements.173 Even in the
absence of legislation, courts may view the enforcement of a private agreement
to mediate as incidental to their authority to unilaterally order parties to participate in mediation174—authority now established by many rules of court;175 the
168

Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 42-45, 74; see generally Federal Arbitration Act, 9
U.S.C. §§ 2-16 (2000).
170 See 9 U.S.C. § 9 (providing for awards based on arbitral proceedings).
171 Seasoned Lawyers Offer Mediation Insights, ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG., Jan.
1994, at 55 (“If one party does not want to solve the problem, mediation will fail.”).
172 See, e.g., Lindsay v. Lewandowski, 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846, 850 (Ct. App. 2006) (noting
that applying arbitration rules to mediation could create confusion); Cafarelli v. Colon-Collazo, No. CV055000279S, 2006 WL 1828608 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 20, 2006) (holding that
absence of mediation, unlike arbitration, did not deprive the court of jurisdiction).
173 See, e.g., Gassner v. Bechtel Constr., 702 So. 2d 548, 552 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)
(discussing FLA. STAT. § 440.211 (1995), which contemplates a range of possible “alternative dispute resolution system[s] to supplement, modify or replace” statutory procedures);
see also California International Arbitration and Conciliation Act, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§§ 1297.11-1297.432 (West 2007); Texas Alternative Dispute Resolution Procedures Act,
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.001-154.073 (Vernon 2007); TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 154.021; UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation (2002).
174 See ELIZABETH PLAPINGER & DONNA STIENSTRA, ADR AND SETTLEMENT IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: A SOURCEBOOK FOR JUDGES AND LAWYERS 66 (1996) (noting that
most federal mediation programs authorize judges to order parties to mediation even without
their consent).
175 See Vitakis-Valchine v. Valchine, 793 So. 2d 1094 1098 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)
(noting that mediation is mandatory as ordered by the court); Fuchs v. Martin, 845 N.E.2d
1038 (Ind. 2006) (holding that court-mandated mediation was not an improper restriction of
court access).
169

\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\8-1\NVJ118.txt

448

unknown

Seq: 22

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

17-JAN-08

9:52

[Vol. 8:427

existence of a contractual agreement to mediate should significantly augment
the judicial prerogative.176
Similarly, mediated agreements may be specifically enforced as contracts
or pursuant to special statutes.177 Where, as is increasingly the case, a contractual dispute resolution agreement calls for mediation followed by arbitration, it
is possible that a court will grant a motion to stay litigation under arbitration
law.178
However, these and a variety of other legal issues surrounding mediation
are still being fleshed out by courts in various jurisdictions.179
3. Treatment of Nonbinding Arbitration and Variants
Although agreements to mediate present a stark contrast to arbitration,
many other agreements for “ADR” (or procedures such as the ICANN Uniform
Dispute Resolution Policy180) fall somewhere in between. For example, some
nonbinding arbitration procedures may be similar in all respects to binding
arbitration, save for a legally binding award.181 The problem with applying
arbitration law to such arrangements is that at least some elements of arbitration
law will be inapposite; the applicability of other aspects of arbitration law will
be matters for argument.
a. A Broad Spectrum of Nonbinding Decisional Processes
This rich spectrum of procedures lying “between” classic mediation and
classic arbitration includes those in which third parties are called upon to produce a decision that is not final and legally binding. Examples include “nonbinding arbitration,” exemplified by the National Advertising Division’s
procedure for resolving disputes over commercial advertising,182 “early neutral
176 Ann T. Pfau & Daniel M. Weitz, Court-Annexed ADR on the Rise, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 12,
1999, at 10.
177 See, e.g., California International Arbitration and Conciliation Act, CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE. § 1297.11 (provides for enforcement of conciliation agreements); TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 154.021.
178 See, e.g., Woodlands Christian Acad. v. Logan, No. 09-97-348 CV, 1998 Tex. App.
LEXIS 3185, at *8-9 (Tex. App. May 21, 1998) (citing arbitration precedents in enforcement
of multi-step procedure involving mediation, then binding arbitration of disputes under
employment agreement).
179 See Coben & Thompson, supra note 3, at 45-47 (noting that information is limited in
regard to mediation due to privacy concerns).
180 See infra note 217 and accompanying text; see also Management of Internet Names and
Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,741 (June 10, 1998) (authorizing individual registrars to issue
domain names in the generic top level domain names, and the administration of country code
top domains is delegated by ICANN); Laurence R. Helfer & Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Designing Non-National Systems: The Case of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 141, 149 n.16 (2001).
181 See, e.g., Wolsey, Ltd. v. Foodmaker, Inc., 144 F.3d 1205 (9th Cir. 1998) (involving
nonbinding arbitration procedure under AAA Arbitration Rules, including some procedures
for pre-hearing discovery).
182 See also CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6200 (West 2007) (California Mandatory Arbitration Act, providing for nonbinding arbitration process for resolution of attorney-client fee
disputes); In re Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 829 (6th Cir. 2003) (procedure
adopted by bankruptcy court required claimants who had personal injury litigation against
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evaluation” in the form that evolved in various court programs,183 some dispute
resolution board or dispute review board (“DRB”) procedures used in infrastructure projects,184 and the dispute resolution procedure under the Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers’ (“ICANN”) Uniform Domain
Name Dispute Resolution Policy (“UDRP”).185 Although process options differ in detail, most tend to be aimed at a “short and sharp” evaluation or decision
by a third party.186 As in mediation, the intent is not to supplant legal process
unless the parties themselves agree to do so. It is not legal compulsion but the
authority of the decision maker or other factors that compels resolution of the
dispute.187
Under some procedures, third party decisions may become binding in the
absence of an appeal.188 In other circumstances, notably under the procedures
of standard state lemon laws and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, a third
party decision may be enforced at the election of one party.189 Other arrangements provide that an arbitration award is binding if below a certain amount,
and nonbinding if above.190 Under other agreements decisions may not be
enforceable in a court of law191 but may be admissible in later legal or administrative proceedings.
Some rubrics of decision-making such as “appraisal” comprehend a wide
range of procedures.192 Some appraisals are intended to be binding deciChapter 11 debtor to submit claims to nonbinding arbitration prior to bringing claims to
court).
183 Wayne D. Brazil et al., Early Neutral Evaluation: An Experimental Effort to Expedite
Dispute Resolution, 69 JUDICATURE 279, 280 n.1 (1986).
184 See Thomas J. Stipanowich, ‘Real Time’ Strategies for Relational Conflict, I.B.A. MEDIATION NEWSL., July 2007, at 6, 8-9.
185 See infra note 325 and accompanying text.
186 See infra note 325 and accompanying text.
187 See AMF Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 621 F. Supp. 456, 463 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (noting that
remedy at law would not address the parties’ concerns; submission to nonbinding authority
was authorized).
188 City of Lincoln v. Soukup, 340 N.W.2d 420 (Neb. 1983) (noting that decisions of
municipal personnel board shall be final and binding upon the appointing authority, specifically that an “order by the personnel board, like the order of any intermediate court or
administrative agency, is final and binding unless appealed”).
189 See Harold Greenberg, The Indiana Motor Vehicle Protection Act of 1988: The Real
Thing for Sweetening the Lemon or Merely a Weak Artificial Sweetener?, 22 IND. L. REV.
57, 60-66 (1988).
190 Such an agreement, which has been employed in insurance policies as a device to deny
trial if the arbitration award does not meet the minimum liability amount of the policy, has
been struck down by most courts that have considered the issue. See, e.g., Fireman’s Fund
Ins. Co. v. Bugailiskis, 662 N.E.2d 555, 557 (Ill. Ct. App. 1996) (citing decisions); Davidson
v. Robertson Orchards, Inc., No. H-99-020, 2000 WL 376407, at *2-3 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr.
14, 2000).
191 See, e.g., PVI, Inc. v. Ratiopharm GMBH, 135 F.3d 1252 (8th Cir. 1998) (refusing to
enforce award under FAA where the parties failed to provide specifically for judicial
enforcement in the agreement).
192 When it comes to the application of arbitration law, contractual arrangements for
appraisal are a continuing source of controversy. Some courts have distinguished
“appraisal” from “arbitration” on the basis that appraisals tend to focus solely on a question
of valuation. See, e.g., Hartford Lloyd’s Ins. Co. v. Teachworth, 898 F.2d 1058, 1063 (5th
Cir. 1990); Rastelli Bros., Inc. v. Neth. Ins. Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 440 (D.N.J. 1999). Broadly
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sions,193 while others are merely advisory.194 Some appraisers are appointed
(and may be affiliated with) a single party, others jointly.195 Some appraisals
are made in the wake of an adversary hearing, while others depend primarily or
solely on the appraiser’s own inquiry and expert judgment.196 The latter
approach is also characteristic of other third party expert decision-making
processes, including the roles traditionally played by design professionals on
construction projects.197
b. Considerations Regarding the Application of Arbitration Law
to Processes Involving Nonbinding Decisions
As we have seen, courts sometimes apply arbitration law to one or another
of the foregoing non-mediation options;198 such cases tend to present closer
questions than does mediation due to their greater similarity to classic arbitration. Judicial application of arbitration law to such arrangements still raises
concerns, however, on functional as well as historical levels.
(1) History, Language, and Structure of the FAA
According to Ian Macneil, a committed student of the history and evolution of federal arbitration law, “The FAA is designed to deal with agreements
speaking, however, the enforceability of arbitration agreements has never hinged on the
comprehensiveness of their scope, but on the intent of the parties: While some arbitrators
have authority to resolve virtually any kind of dispute relating to a contract, others’ authority
is narrowly circumscribed. See 2 MACNEIL, SPIEDEL & STIPANOWICH, supra note 27, § 20.2.
193 Appraisers are often explicitly designated “arbitrators.” See, e.g., Blutt v. Integrated
Health Servs., Inc., No. 96 CIV.3612 LLS., 1996 WL 389292 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 1996). See
generally Melvin D. Kraft, Arbitration of Real Estate Valuation Disputes: Strategies in
Preparing and Proving the Case, ARB. J., Sept. 1987, at 15. The presence or absence of
such a label, however, is not necessarily dispositive of the question of whether arbitration
law should apply. See supra text accompanying note 73.
194 Compare Fit Tech, Inc. v. Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp., 374 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2004)
(holding that accountant dispute resolution remedy is arbitration), and McDonnell Douglas
Fin. Corp. v. Pa. Power & Light Co., 858 F.2d 825, 830-31 (2d Cir. 1988), with Salt Lake
Tribune Pub. Co. v. Mgmt. Planning, Inc., 390 F.3d 684 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that
appraisal agreement was not arbitration because it will provide parties with a data point but
not a binding decision).
195 Herbert Dodell, Using the Appraisal Process to Resolve Insurance Disputes, L.A. LAWYER, July-Aug. 2002, at 15 (noting that appraisers may be chosen separately and jointly in
appraisal process).
196 See, e.g., Bratanov v. Riemenschneider, 439 N.E.2d 434 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980) (holding
that adversary appraisal should allow defendant to have a pre-hearing independent
appraisal).
197 See Stipanowich, supra note 2, at 846-47.
198 See, e.g., In re Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 829, 831 (6th Cir. 2003); Dow
Corning Corp. v. Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 335 F.3d 742 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v.
Bankers Ins. Co., 245 F.3d 315, 322 (4th Cir. 2001); Wolsey, Ltd. v. Foodmaker, Inc., 144
F.3d 1205, 1207-09 (9th Cir. 1998); AMF Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 621 F. Supp. 456, 460
(E.D.N.Y. 1985); Homes of Legend, Inc. v. McCollough, 776 So.2d 741 (Ala. 2000); Krut v.
Whitecap Hous. Group, LLC, 602 S.E.2d 201, 207 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004) (FAA); Kelley v.
Benchmark Homes, Inc., 550 N.W.2d 640 (Neb. 1996). Contra Fit Tech, 374 F.3d 1;
Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 371 (3d Cir. 2003); Schaefer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 590
N.E.2d 1242 (Ohio 1992) (applying Ohio law); Godfrey v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 16 P.3d
617 (Wash. 2001) (applying Washington Arbitration Act).
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to engage in binding arbitration . . . [and not] nonbinding arbitration.”199
Indeed, “[i]ts entire history is free of any suggestion of such intention, and it
was precisely the fear of nonbinding awards that led to the need expressed in
the House Report . . . ‘to make the contracting party live up to [its]
agreement.’”200
A possible “loophole” for those seeking to apply the FAA to nonbinding
arbitration exists in FAA § 9, which provides:
If the parties in their agreement have agreed that a judgment of the court shall be
entered upon the award made pursuant to the arbitration, and shall specify the court,
then at any time within one year after the award is made any party to the arbitration
may apply to the court so specified for an order confirming the award, and thereupon
the court must grant such order unless the award is vacated, modified, or corrected as
prescribed in sections 10 and 11 of this title. If no court is specified in the agreement
of the parties, then such application may be made to the United States District Court
in and for the district within which such award was made.201

The first sentence of FAA section 9 may be read as simply enabling parties to
select the court in which they wish to enter their judgment, but another, very
plausible interpretation of the plain language is that statutory confirmation of
an award is only available if the parties have included an entry of judgment
clause.202 The latter reading would support the concept that nonbinding arbitration agreements would also be enforceable (to a point) under the FAA. A
number of arguments have been advanced against such a reading, however;203
the most compelling of these is a historical one. At the time the FAA was
enacted it was common to enforce arbitration awards through ordinary contract
actions; the expedited confirmation procedure set forth in the FAA provided an
alternative route to judicial enforcement.204 It may be that Congress intended
the expedited statutory procedure to apply only in the presence of an entry of
judgment provision and to otherwise leave parties to their traditional common
law remedy for the enforcement of binding arbitration awards; the purpose of
FAA section 9 was to reserve the statutory confirmation process for those situations in which parties used the “magic” entry-of-judgment language in their
binding arbitration agreement, while other binding arbitration awards would
need to be enforced via the common law route.205 In the absence of any other
evidence to the contrary, this historical evidence undercuts the argument that
FAA section 9 provides a loophole for agreements specifically contemplating a
nonbinding award.
(2) Functional Comparison
A process culminating in a nonbinding decision is in most cases aimed at
encouraging settlement, with the decision serving as an objective spur to con199

1 MACNEIL, SPIEDEL & STIPANOWICH, supra note 27, § 9.8.1, at 9:55-9:57.
Id. at 9:57. Cf. Schmitz, supra note 2, at 9-14, 26-46 (discussing arbitral “finality” and
the relevant history of judicial attitudes toward arbitration and the legislative history of federal and state arbitration statutes).
201 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2000).
202 4 MACNEIL, SPIEDEL & STIPANOWICH, supra note 27, § 38.2.2.
203 See id. §§ 38.2.2.1-.3; see also Schmitz, supra note 78.
204 4 MACNEIL, SPIEDEL & STIPANOWICH, supra note 27, § 38.2.2.2, at 38:22-38:23.
205 Id. at 38:23-38:24.
200
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sensus.206 Such processes are in this sense more akin to mediation, in which
the intervener aims to empower parties to find their own solution, often by
imparting a dose of reality and objectivity, rather than binding arbitration, in
which responsibility for a decision on the merits as well as procedural questions
is consigned to a third party. There is, moreover, no legal guarantee of a resolution—only varying levels of expectation and hopefulness. For this reason,
some courts have found nonbinding arbitration processes to “frustrate the public policy goal of arbitration in many cases since it adds costs and delay when
an award is rejected [through trial de novo].”207 Such concerns also underlie
the AMF rationale that arbitration law should only enforce nonbinding arbitration agreements that are reasonably likely to settle the dispute(s).208
For a court to confirm a “nonbinding” award under arbitration law would
be a seemingly useless exercise and contravene the parties’ agreement; under
the FAA confirmation would also violate the precept that federal judgments
must be binding in order to “satisfy the constitutional requirement of a justiciable case or controversy.”209 But can the same be said of other elements of
arbitration law? Even without a binding decision, such a process may furnish a
very real “day in court,” and coercing participation offers the possibility of
conserving judicial resources, especially if the process appears likely to resolve
the dispute finally.210 As exemplified by the process sponsored by the National
Advertising Division,211 even a nonbinding decision might trigger coercive
efforts by third parties (such as members of a commercial peer group or trade
association) or establish a compelling framework for negotiation.
It is thus conceivable that some or all of the due process concerns that
underlie standards for judicial vacatur of award under arbitration law—a fair
opportunity to be heard, absence of ex parte communications, the disclosure of
potential conflicts of interest by the third party decision maker, and the absence
of other forms of misconduct—are also of legitimate concern to those agreeing
to processes for nonbinding “advisory” decisions. Therefore, judicial decisions
fleshing out concepts of “fundamental fairness” under arbitration law may be
206

Nonbinding arbitration is the submission of a dispute to an arbitrator with the understanding
at the outset that the result will be purely advisory, and the result will be treated by the parties as
a recommendation for settlement. If the parties do settle as a result of nonbinding arbitration,
the court does not confirm the arbitration award; rather, it enforces the settlement contract, the
terms of which may be different from the arbitrator’s award.

Godfrey v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 993 P.2d 281, 285-86 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (Becker, J.,
dissenting on other grounds) (citation omitted), rev’d on other grounds, 16 P.3d 617 (Wash.
2001); see Advanced Bodycare Solutions LLC v. Thione Int’l, Inc., No. 06-81128-CIVHurley, 2007 WL 1246024, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 30, 2007) (nonbinding arbitration provision
“merely provides a forum for the parties to pursue pre-suit settlement negotiations”).
207 Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Bugailiskis, 662 N.E.2d 555, 558 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
208 AMF Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 621 F. Supp. 456 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
209 1 MACNEIL, SPIEDEL & STIPANOWICH, supra note 27, § 9.8.1, at 9:57 (quoting AMF, 621
F. Supp. at 460).
210 See Schaefer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 590 N.E.2d 1242, 1251 (Ohio 1992) (Wright, J., concurring) (reasoning that courts should be able to compel nonbinding arbitration and stay
litigation).
211 See supra text accompanying notes 101-06 (discussing AMF).
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helpful guidelines in nonbinding decision-making. This is especially so if the
advisory decision is admissible in later legal or administrative proceedings.212
Depending on the circumstances, it may also be possible to advance coherent arguments in support of judicial appointment of a third party intervener to
render a nonbinding decision, just as they would a “binding arbitrator” under a
traditional arbitration agreement. Likewise, there may be justifications for judicial enforcement of a subpoena issued by the third party, or even to accord
those who make decisions, though merely “advisory,” quasi-judicial immunity
in order to protect the process from the taint of coercion, as in binding
arbitration.213
But if such conclusions are possible with respect to non-mediation nonbinding dispute resolution processes, they are far from inevitable. Nonbinding
procedures are often extremely abbreviated—essentially nothing more than the
shortest expedient route to an outside opinion. The whole idea is to get the
latter without the risk of being legally bound; conversely, the absence of legal
consequences makes it possible to abide highly attenuated procedures.214
Thus, evidence may be greatly limited and ex parte communications and other
“irregularities” may be tolerated; some aspects of neutral authority, such as the
authority to issue subpoenas, may be at variance with the likely intentions of
the parties. In short, application of arbitration law in order to enforce an agreement may open up a bigger can of worms on other points of law and might
conceivably undermine the intent of parties to nonbinding processes.215
Dluhos v. Strasberg,216 a decision involving procedures under the 1999
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers’ (“ICANN”) Uniform
Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (“UDRP”),217 is illustrative of the
incompatibility of some nonbinding procedures with arbitration law.218 In that
decision, the Third Circuit reversed a district court decision confirming an
award rendered by a tribunal under the UDRP219 on the ground that the
212 Such concerns appear to have motivated the Eighth Circuit to conclude that the FAA
authorized a non-merits judicial review of a nonbinding arbitration award on grounds of
“evident partiality” in Dow Corning Corp. v. Safety National Casualty Corp., 335 F.3d 742
(8th Cir. 2003).
213 See Lundgren v. Freeman, 307 F.2d 104 (9th Cir. 1962). But see Salt Lake Tribune
Publ’g Co. v. Mgmt. Planning, Inc., 390 F.3d 684 (10th Cir. 2004) (since process did not
constitute “arbitration,” appraiser was not entitled to immunity).
214 Thomas J. Stipanowich, Resolving Consumer Disputes: Due Process Protocol Protects
Consumer Rights, DISP. RESOL. J., Aug. 1998, at 8, 14.
215 See Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (holding that an arbitrator has a duty to disclose to the parties any of his dealings that “might
create an impression of possible bias”); Univ. Commons-Urbana, Ltd. v. Universal Constructors Inc., 304 F.3d 1331, 1338-41 (11th Cir. 2002) (panel concluded that the parties to a
nonbinding arbitration agreement intended to make disclosures in accordance with Commonwealth Coatings).
216 Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365 (3d Cir. 2003).
217 ICANN, Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (Oct. 24, 1999), http://www.
icann.org/udrp/udrp-policy-24oct99.htm.
218 For present purposes we do not treat what must be another important issue—the apparent inapplicability of the FAA, which is aimed at facilitating agreements to arbitrate, to nonconsensual procedure established by statute.
219 After plaintiff Dluhos registered the domain name www.leestrasberg.com, interests representing the estate of actor and acting coach Lee Strasberg filed a complaint with provider
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UDRP’s unique contractual arrangement, which does not prevent any party
from filing suit before, during, or after the dispute resolution proceedings, renders the FAA’s provisions for limited, post-award judicial action inapplicable.220 Moreover, because a trademark holder or a holder’s representative need
not use the UDRP procedure before going to court, FAA provisions for judicial
compulsion to arbitrate prior to judicial review and judicial stays of litigation
pending completion of arbitration are inapposite. The UDRP proceedings were
never intended to supplant court proceedings, unlike “methods . . . covered by
the FAA,” but merely to afford an additional forum for dispute resolution with
an explicit right of appeal to the courts.221 The court remanded the case for de
novo review of the tribunal’s award under the Anticybersquatting Consumer
Protection Act.222
Even where arbitration law is arguably a more suitable template for judicial treatment of a particular nonbinding decision-making procedure, courts
should still be required to proceed carefully when asked to apply a particular
principle of arbitration law (such as subpoena power or arbitral immunity) to
nonbinding decision-making. Given the amount of litigation surrounding nonbinding arbitration provisions and the conflicting judicial responses, however,
it is far from clear that courts are up to the challenge of “tailoring” the application of arbitration law to one-off situations as proposed by Professor Rau.223
c. Alternative Bases for Enforcement
As a number of courts have observed, nonbinding ADR agreements may
also be enforceable under general principles of contract.224 In AMF, the court
made the case for equitable enforcement of a provision to submit disputes over
advertised claims to the National Advertising Division for advisory nonbinding
resolution.225 In agreeing to use the NAD procedure in lieu of litigating, the
National Arbitration Forum under the terms of the ICANN UDRP procedure, alleging that
the name was “identical or confusingly similar to” an estate-owned trademark. Dluhos filed
a letter of limited appearance before NAF to contest jurisdiction and announced an intent to
file suit in federal court challenging the constitutionality of the process, which he did. Proceeding without Dluhos’ participation, the NAF panel issued an award directing that the
domain name registered by Dluhos be transferred to the Strasberg estate. After Dluhos filed
an amended, broad-based complaint in federal court, all the defendants filed motions to
dismiss for failure to state a claim. The court granted the defendants’ motions, and proceeded to review NAF’s decision under the grounds provided in FAA section 10(a) and the
“manifest disregard” standard. The court confirmed NAF’s decision as an arbitration award.
Dluhos, 321 F.3d at 367-69.
220 The UDRP contemplates the possibility of judicial intervention since either party may at
any time “submit[ ] the dispute to a court of competent jurisdiction for independent resolution.” Id. at 371.
221 Id.
222 The decision pays significant lip service to Judge Weinstein’s AMF decision. Id. at 370
(The FAA applies to a dispute resolution mechanism if “viewed in light of the reasonable
commercial expectations the dispute will be settled by this arbitration.”) (quoting AMF Inc.
v. Brunswick Corp., 621 F. Supp. 456, 461 (E.D.N.Y. 1985))); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)
(2000).
223 See supra text accompanying note 133.
224 See, e.g., Rastelli Bros., Inc. v. Neth. Ins. Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 440 (D.N.J. 1999); AMF,
621 F. Supp. at 461.
225 AMF, 621 F. Supp. 456.
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parties had “evince[d] a clear intent . . . to require confidential submission to
the NAD of disputes”; both had bargained for and received benefits from the
stipulation, including “[s]peed, informality and modest cost,” and the “particular experience and skill of the NAD as a resolver of disputes.”226 Equitable
relief was appropriate because the legal remedy—the very litigation the parties
sought to avoid by bargain—
would be inadequate since it could only approximate the skilled, speedy and inexpensive efforts available by way of specific performance. A law suit would deny AMF
the practical specialized experience that the parties agreed to have available for an
examination of data-based comparative advertising. A court decision and an NAD
decision would have different effects on the parties’ reputations within [their]
industry.227

In today’s environment, moreover, nonbinding third-party decision-making
procedures (whether consensual or statute-based) are increasingly employed in
statutory schemes as well as private contract, thus reflecting favorable public
policy.228
As previously discussed, however, the courts are far from unanimous on
grounds for enforcement of nonbinding decision-making agreements. There
are jurisdictions in which nonbinding arbitration is not judicially recognized229
and others in which the issue remains in doubt.230 In particular, widespread
litigation has failed to produce clarity with respect to the treatment of various
forms of appraisal or of procedures for the arbitration of claims against uninsured motorists with trial de novo where awards exceed a certain amount.231
4. Decisional Processes Without Adversary Hearings
The application of arbitration law to some forms of appraisal and other
processes in which third parties make decisions without first receiving evidence
and/or arguments in some kind of adversary hearing have also proven problem226

Id. at 462.
Id. at 463.
228 See Schaefer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 590 N.E.2d 1242, 1251 (Ohio 1992) (Wright, J., concurring) (“[T]he promotion of nonbinding arbitration as one of a panoply of alternative dispute resolution procedures is presently favored public policy in our state.”).
229 See, e.g., Godfrey v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 16 P.3d 617 (Wash. 2001). Washington
arbitration law “does not contemplate nonbinding arbitration.” Id. at 621; see also Omni
Tech Corp. v. MPC Solutions Sales, LLC, 432 F.3d 797 (7th Cir. 2005) (reversing district
court denying enforcement to a dispute resolution clause). The Omni court specified that an
independent accountant would act as an expert and not as an arbitrator, observing that the
district court “assumed that it may ignore any form of alternative dispute resolution other
than ‘arbitration.’ ” Id. at 799; see also Salt Lake Tribune Publ’g Co. v. Mgmt. Planning,
Inc., 390 F.3d 684 (10th Cir. 2004) (appraisal process was not “arbitration” because it did
not provide a binding decision, appraiser therefore denied immunity).
230 See, e.g., Schaefer, 590 N.E.2d 1242 (two conflicting plurality opinions; court declared
de novo provisions unenforceable under arbitration law). Compare Davidson v. Robertson
Orchards, Inc., No. H-99-020, 2000 WL 376407 (Ohio. Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2000) (holding
that arbitration clause not binding when finality was contingent on outcome), with McGuffey
v. LensCrafters, Inc., No. CA2005-03-069, 2006 WL 156697 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2006)
(holding that trial court should not have ordered binding arbitration).
231 See Schmitz, supra note 78, at 167-74; see also Parker v. Am. Family Ins. Co., 734
N.E.2d 83 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
227
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atic for courts.232 Some courts have concluded that if an appraisal procedure
contemplates no opportunity for the parties to be “heard” by the appraiser in
some fashion, it is not arbitration.233 Other courts, however, have treated
appraisal as arbitration despite the absence of any form of hearing.234
Procedures that do not contemplate hearings certainly appear to fall
outside the ambit of FAA section 10 and similar state provisions to the extent
they hinge on the concept of a fundamentally fair hearing235 before the third
party decision maker.236 Other elements of the FAA, however, are arguably
relevant, including some grounds for vacatur (evident partiality, arbitral misconduct, or exceeding one’s powers),237 but there remain questions of judicial
efficiency.238
Again, moreover, there may be ready alternatives to the law of arbitration
for enforcement of some such procedures. In Omni Tech Corp. v. MPC Solutions Sales, LLC,239 the Seventh Circuit overturned a district court order denying a buyer’s motion to stay an action pending resolution of a dispute by a firm
of accountants in accordance with a contractually specified procedure, even
though the contract provided that the accountants would act “as experts and not
as arbitrators.”240 Writing for the court, Judge Easterbrook questioned why the
district court assumed it could “ignore any form of alternative dispute resolution other than ‘arbitration’ . . . [since m]any contracts have venue of forumselection clauses . . . [that] do not call for ‘arbitration’ but are routinely
enforced, even when they send the dispute for resolution outside the court’s
jurisdiction.”241
232

See supra text accompanying notes 111-15.
6A ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 1432-44B (1962). On the contrary, see 1 MACNEIL, SPIEDEL & STIPANOWICH, supra note 27, § 2.3.2, but note that the
same treatise identifies an “adjudicatory process” as sine qua non in 1 MACNEIL, SPIEDEL &
STIPANOWICH, supra note 27, § 2.1.2, and treats the requirement of a fundamentally fair
hearing in 3 MACNEIL, SPIEDEL & STIPANOWICH, supra note 27, § 32.4.
234 See, e.g., Hirt v. Hervey, 578 P.2d 624, 627 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978).
235 See 3 MACNEIL, SPIEDEL & STIPANOWICH, supra note 27, § 32.3.1, and cases cited
therein.
236 At the same time “almost all procedural rights” under arbitration statutes may be
“waived by word or action.” Id. § 32.4.1.1, at 32:35. Under New York arbitration law,
nearly any statutory requirement respecting arbitration hearings “may be waived by written
consent of the parties and it is waived if the parties continue with the arbitration without
objection.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7506(f) (McKinney 2007).
237 Moreover, courts have enforced awards even though parties have unilaterally waived
their right to present evidence. See supra text accompanying note 53.
238 Cf. supra text accompanying notes 215-23.
239 Omni Tech Corp. v. MPC Solutions Sales, LLC, 432 F.3d 797 (7th Cir. 2005).
240 Id. at 799. The statement that the firm of accountants would act as an expert and not as
an arbitrator means that it will resolve the dispute as accountants do—by examining the
corporate books and applying normal accounting principles plus any special definitions the
parties have adopted—rather than by entertaining arguments from lawyers and listening to
testimony.
241 Id. (citing Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991); Publicis Commc’n
v. True N. Commc’ns Inc., 132 F.3d 363 (7th Cir. 1997); Omron Healthcare, Inc. v. Maclaren Exps. Ltd., 28 F.3d 600 (7th Cir. 1994)). The statement that the firm of accountants
would act as an expert and not as an arbitrator means that it will resolve the dispute as
accountants do—by examining the corporate books and applying normal accounting princi233
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Many different kinds of contracts presently include provisions contemplating multi-step processes for dispute resolution.242 Such provisions often call
for parties to resolve disputes through negotiation and/or mediation before turn-

ples plus any special definitions the parties have adopted—rather than by entertaining arguments from lawyers and listening to testimony.
Nevertheless, the language was not merely “hortatory” and must be honored; Easterbrook concluded: “[T]he judge is no more entitled to ignore it than he could ignore the
contract’s detailed definition of ‘net working capital.’ ” Id.
(The court did not reach the question of whether, if the definition of “arbitration” for the
purposes of the FAA is federal whether every provision for a “final and binding” decision
should be called an agreement to arbitrate.)
242 See, e.g., Davis v. O’Melveny & Myers, 485 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2007) (employment
contract); Tittle v. Enron Corp., 463 F.3d 410 (5th Cir. 2006) (fiduciary liability insurance
policies); Image Software, Inc. v. Reynolds & Reynolds Co., 459 F.3d 1044 (10th Cir. 2006)
(software licensing agreement); Albert M. Higley Co. v. N/S Corp., 445 F.3d 861 (6th Cir.
2006) (construction subcontract); Schoenduve Corp. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 442 F.3d 727
(9th Cir. 2006); Am. Gen. Life and Accident Ins. Co. v. Wood, 429 F.3d 83 (4th Cir. 2005)
(stepped employment system); Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 428 F.3d 1359 (11th
Cir. 2005) (stepped employment system); Bank Julius Baer & Co. v. Waxfield Ltd., 424 F.3d
278 (2d Cir. 2005) (third party collateral deposit agreements); Summit Contractors, Inc. v.
Legacy Corner, LLC, 147 F. App’x 798 (10th Cir. 2005) (construction contract); Prescott v.
Northlake Christian Sch., 141 F. App’x 263 (5th Cir. 2005) (employment contract between
principal and Christian school); Hill v. PeopleSoft USA, Inc., 412 F.3d 540 (4th Cir. 2005)
(stepped employment system); Parsons Energy & Chems. Group, Inc. v. Williams Union
Boiler, 128 F. App’x 920 (3d Cir. 2005) (construction contract); DSMC Inc. v. Convera
Corp., 349 F.3d 679 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (digital storage services contract); Hawkins v. Aid
Ass’n for Lutherans, 338 F.3d 801 (7th Cir. 2003) (fraternal benefit society contract); HIM
Portland, LLC v. DeVito Builders, Inc., 317 F.3d 41 (1st Cir. 2003) (construction contract);
Kemiron Atl., Inc. v. Aguakem Int’l, Inc., 290 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2002) (distributorship
contract); Hightower v. GMRI, Inc., 272 F.3d 239 (4th Cir. 2001) (stepped employment
system); Texaco Exploration and Prod. Co. v. AmClyde Engineered Prods. Co., 243 F.3d
906 (5th Cir. 2001) (construction contract); Sec. Watch, Inc. v. Sentinel Sys., Inc., 176 F.3d
369 (6th Cir. 1999) (contract for security services); Keymer v. Mgmt. Recruiters Int’l, Inc.,
169 F.3d 501 (8th Cir. 1999) (manager’s employment agreement); Drayton Grain Processors
v. NE Foods, Inc., No. 3:06-cv-37, 2007 WL 983825 (D.N.D. Mar. 30, 2007) (LLC agreement); Stones River Elec., Inc. v. Chevron Energy Solutions Co., No. 5:06CV-115-R, 2007
WL 433083 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 2, 2007) (electrical installation contract); CACI Premier Tech.,
Inc. v. Faraci, 464 F. Supp. 2d 527 (E.D. Va. 2006) (employment contract); ZARS, Inc. v.
LTS Lohmann Therapy Sys. Corp., No. 2:05-CV-198 TC, 2006 WL 2992719 (D. Utah Oct.
18, 2006) (product development contract); Fisher v. GE Med. Sys., 276 F. Supp. 2d 891
(M.D. Tenn. 2003) (stepped employment system); SI V, LLC v. FMC Corp., 223 F. Supp. 2d
1059 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (contract for purchase and sale of land); Bono v. David, 54 Cal. Rptr.
3d 837 (Ct. App. 2007) (real property development contract); Auchter Co. v. Zagloul, 949
So. 2d 1189 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (construction contract); Pheng Invs., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 196 S.W.3d 322 (Tex. App. 2006) (real estate purchase contract).
There are also contractual provisions that refer to mediation and arbitration in the alternative. See In re The IT Group, Inc., 359 B.R. 97 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006); Covenant Health
Rehab. of Picayune, L.P. v. Brown, 949 So. 2d 732 (Miss. 2007). This practice may result in
confusion and unpredictable results in court. See, e.g., Ex parte Indus. Techs., Inc., 707 So.
2d 234 (Ala. 1997).
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ing to binding arbitration.243 These tiered “filtering systems” are grounded on
the notion that disputes are best resolved by relatively informal, flexible, efficient, and inexpensive means, and that binding adjudication through arbitration
or litigation should be reserved as a final step in the event all else fails.244 At
the same time, however, multi-step dispute resolution agreements present new
issues for counselors and courts245 (as do scenarios involving interplay between
the statutory nonbinding arbitration system and consensual binding
arbitration).246
When a party to a multi-step process fails or refuses to participate in contractually-mandated negotiation or mediation, a court may be asked to enforce
the agreement to negotiate or to mediate. If the contract also includes an agreement to arbitrate, there will likely be questions regarding the enforceability of
that agreement.247 A party seeking to enforce the arbitration agreement may
also argue that issues surrounding the enforceability of earlier “steps” (such as
negotiation or mediation) should be decided not by a court, but by the arbitrator(s).248 Such scenarios have spawned a growing body of federal and state
court decisions under arbitration statutes. Judicial response varies dramatically,
with some courts establishing positions that appear inconsistent with policies
supporting the broad enforcement of arbitration agreements and other courts
arguably reaching too far in the opposite direction.
A troubling example of the latter is Kemiron Atlantic, Inc. v. Aguakem
International, Inc. 249 In that decision the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a district
court order denying a motion to enforce an arbitration provision and stay a suit
243

CPR COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF ARBITRATION, Arbitration and the ADR Landscape, in
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AT ITS BEST: SUCCESSFUL STRATEGIES FOR BUSINESS USERS ch.
1 (Thomas J. Stipanowich & Peter H. Kaskell eds., 2001).
244 See Welborn Clinic v. MedQuist, Inc., 301 F.3d 634 (7th Cir. 2002) (party’s failure to
follow contractual requirements of good faith negotiations and timely notice was not waiver
of right to compel arbitration). The purpose of technical requirements is “to encourage successful negotiations so that neither litigation nor arbitration will be necessary, not to prefer
the courts to an arbitrator if informal discussions break down.” Id. at 638-39.
245 See Prescott, 141 F. App’x at 267-69 (5th Cir. 2005) (multi-step process raises special
interpretational issues).
246 See, e.g., Ervin, Cohen & Jessup, LLP v. Kassel, 54 Cal. Rptr. 3d 685 (Ct. App. 2007)
(client waiver of right to nonbinding arbitration under California Mandatory Fee Arbitration
Act meant that law firm could require arbitration of disputes under contractual binding arbitration agreement).
247 See Michael Pryles, Multi-Tiered Dispute Resolution Clauses, 18 J. INT’L ARB. 159
(2001) (discussing the question in the context of international arbitration and the New York
Convention); see also Channel Tunnel Group Ltd. v. Balfour Beatty Constr. Ltd., [1993]
A.C. 334 (H.L.) (Eng.) (enforcing a dispute resolution agreement that required resort to a
panel of experts prior to ICC arbitration under the inherent jurisdiction of the court and the
English Arbitration Act).
248 In re R & R Pers. Specialists of Tyler, Inc., 146 S.W.3d 699, 704-05 (Tex. App. 2004).
But see Tekmen & Co. v. S. Builders, Inc., No. Civ.A.04C03007RFS, 2005 WL 1249035
(Del. Super. Ct. May 25, 2005).
249 Kemiron Atl., Inc. v. Aguakem Int’l, Inc., 290 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2002); see also In re
Pisces Foods, L.L.C, No. 03-06-00274-CV, 2007 WL 1518076, at *1, 4 (Tex. App. May 24,
2007) (where multi-step agreement provided that “[i]f you have a work-related problem that
involves a legally protected right that could not be settled through Steps 1, 2, or 3 of the
Program, you may request arbitration,” effect of failure to comply with preliminary steps
was matter for judicial determination).
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where neither party requested mediation, a preliminary step in the parties’ dispute resolution agreement. Kemiron had sued Aguakem for breach of contract
for the sale of chemicals; it also pled unjust enrichment and sought a declaratory judgment. The contract contained a dispute resolution clause that provided
“the parties shall be free to [engage in] . . . the prompt and effective adjustment
of any . . . differences . . . under friendly and courteous circumstances.”250
Failing settlement in this fashion, the agreement provided that “the matter shall
be mediated within fifteen (15) days after receipt of notice . . . .” Finally, the
contract provided that “[i]n the event the dispute cannot be settled through
mediation, the parties shall submit the matter to arbitration within ten (10) days
after receipt of notice . . . .”251
Aguakem’s motion to stay Kemiron’s suit pending arbitration pursuant to
the FAA was denied by the district court on the basis that there was no duty to
arbitrate until the parties had first mediated their dispute, followed by a notice
by a party of the intention to arbitrate. Reviewing the district court’s determination de novo, the Eleventh Circuit panel also concluded that the agreement to
arbitrate was “conditioned by the plain language” of the provision requiring
mediation before arbitration.252
Kemiron’s interpretation of the multi-step dispute resolution provision
might appear rational on its face, but it seems inconsistent with the strong FAA
policy supporting broad enforceability of arbitration agreements and ignores
repeated Supreme Court directives respecting the relative spheres of courts and
arbitrators with regard to arbitrability determinations. In John Wiley & Sons,
Inc. v. Livingston,253 the Court made clear that arbitration law charges courts
with the responsibility to determine whether there is a valid arbitration agreement and whether a particular issue is within the scope of that agreement,254 in
which case it falls to the arbitrator(s) to address all subsequent issues, procedural and substantive, leading to a final award on the merits, including questions
about compliance with procedures for properly invoking and maintaining a
claim.255
Since the Court’s pronouncement of respective spheres of authority in
John Wiley, the principles espoused in that decision have been repeatedly and
forcefully restated.256 Moreover, the Court has repeatedly emphasized the limitations on the judicial role in enforcing arbitration agreements while underlining the far-reaching authority of arbitrators under broad-form arbitration
clauses.257 In Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,258 the Court made it
250

Kemiron, 290 F.3d at 1289.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
252 Id. at 1291.
253 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
254 Id. at 547.
255 Id. at 557-58.
256 See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003); Howsam v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002).
257 See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983)
(“[A]ny doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of
arbitration . . . .”). For a typical “broad-form” clause, see Collins & Aikman Products Co. v.
Building Systems, Inc., 58 F.3d 16, 20 (2d Cir. 1995) (“The clause . . . submitting to arbitration ‘[a]ny claim or controversy arising out of or relating to th[e] agreement,’ is the paradigm
251
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plain that judicial questions of arbitrability were of “limited scope . . applicable in the kind of narrow circumstance where contracting parties would likely
have expected a court to have decided the gateway matter,” but not to “‘procedural’ questions which grow out of the dispute and bear on its final disposition259 . . . [as well as] ‘allegation[s] of waiver, delay, or a like defense to
arbitrability.’”260 The Court went on to explain that limiting the judicial role to
such “narrow circumstance[s] . . . avoids the risk of forcing parties to arbitrate a
matter that they may well not have agreed to arbitrate.”261 On this basis, the
Court concluded that a contractual time limit on the eligibility of disputes for
arbitration was to be resolved by arbitrators and not the court.262 The functional dichotomy between courts and arbitrator was subsequently applied with
extreme vigor by the plurality in Green Tree Financial Corp v. Bazzle in support of the conclusion that the question of whether “classwide” arbitration
involving many contracts between a company and numerous different consumers was appropriate was for the arbitrator and not the court under a broad-form
clause.263
The multi-step ADR agreement in Kemiron contained no specific language supporting the conclusion that a party’s failure to participate in mediation was a matter for the court and not arbitrators. This is not, arguably, one of
that narrow category of situations in which parties would have expected a court
to address the procedural issues. Under the circumstances, the court should
have referred the issue of enforcement of the mediation agreement to the arbitrators.264 The ironic result of the decision is that the parties ended up in court,
which seems far indeed from the spirit of their original agreement.
of a broad clause.” (quoting David L. Threlkeld & Co. v. Metallgesellschaft Ltd., 923 F.2d
245, 251 (2d Cir. 1991))).
258 Howsam, 537 U.S. 79.
259 Id. at 83-84 (quoting Livingston, 376 U.S. at 557).
260 Id. (quoting Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24-25).
261 Id.
262 Id. at 85. The Court favorably cited the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act of 2000,
which states that an “arbitrator shall decide whether a condition precedent to arbitrability has
been fulfilled.” Id. “[W]hether prerequisites such as time limits, notice, laches, estoppel,
and other conditions precedent to an obligation to arbitrate have been met, are for the arbitrators to decide.” Id. (second emphasis added).
263 Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003). In Bazzle, the Supreme Court
vacated and remanded South Carolina court decisions affirming awards of damages to two
classes of plaintiffs in class action arbitrations involving numerous claims against Green
Tree Financial Corporation for violations of the Consumer Protection Code. Id. at 447. The
South Carolina Supreme Court held that the contracts were silent with respect to class arbitration, authorized class arbitration, and concluded that the arbitration had properly taken
place. Id. at 450. Three justices joined Justice Breyer in concluding that under the broadform arbitration provisions in the consumer contracts at issues, the unresolved question of
whether the parties intended to engage in classwide arbitration was for the arbitrator, not the
court. Id. at 451. Justice Stevens concurred in the result on the basis that the South Carolina
decision was correct. Id. at 454-55 (Stevens, J., concurring).
264 Thus, for example, in Welborn Clinic v. MedQuist, Inc., 301 F.3d 634 (7th Cir. 2002), a
court ruled that a party’s failure to follow contractually mandated requirements to enter into
good-faith negotiations and provide timely notice did not undermine the enforceability of the
arbitration agreement. The court explained that the purpose of the preliminary step was “to
encourage successful negotiations so that neither litigation nor arbitration will be necessary,
not to prefer the courts to an arbitrator if informal discussions break down.” Id. at 639.
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Consider, by way of contrast, a recent federal court decision that consigned to arbitration the validity of a mediated settlement agreement that,
among other things, purported to vitiate the arbitration provision in the parties’
contract.265 Because the arbitration clause covered “any controversy or claim
arising out of or relating to this contract,” the court held that the question of the
validity of the settlement agreement was itself arbitrable since it had its “origin
or genesis” in the contract.266
Of course, when it comes to divining the respective responsibilities of
courts and arbitrators on matters of arbitrability, the intent of the parties controls.267 Therefore, in the event the parties have clearly stated their intention
that courts and not arbitrators will address issues surrounding negotiation,
mediator, or other preliminaries to arbitration in a multi-step agreement, then
that intention should be honored. On this basis, some courts have concluded
that contractual provisions that specifically make mediation a “condition precedent” to arbitration create justiciable arbitrability issues if a party refuses or
fails to mediate. Such was the case in HIM Portland, LLC v. DeVito Builders,
Inc.,268 addressing an agreement that provided that disputes shall “be subject to
mediation as a condition precedent to arbitration or the institution of legal or
equitable proceedings by either party.”269
Under dicta in Howsam supporting a narrow view of arbitrability, however, even “conditions precedent” are normally expected to fall within the purview of arbitrators and not courts270—a conclusion that reinforces policies
supporting arbitration but may be troublesome to scholars of contract.271 The
issue is further complicated by the fact that most arbitration rules provide arbitrators with virtually plenary authority regarding jurisdictional and enforcement
issues. Contec Corp. v. Remote Solution Co. 272 follows the strong majority
rule that when parties to an arbitration agreement “explicitly incorporate rules
that empower an arbitrator to decide issues of arbitrability, the incorporation
265

Prime Vision Health, Inc. v. Ind. Eye Clinic, P.C., No. IP 00-0096 C-B/S, 2000 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 9893 (S.D. Ind. July 13, 2000).
266 Id. at *10-11.
267 See Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002).
268 HIM Portland, LLC v. DeVito Builders, Inc., 317 F.3d 41 (1st Cir. 2003).
269 Id. at 42 (emphasis omitted). The contract further specified that “mediation shall proceed in advance of arbitration” and that “[c]laims, disputes, and other matters . . . that are not
resolved by mediation . . . shall be decided by arbitration.” Id. at 42-43 (emphasis omitted).
Cf. White v. Kampner, 641 A.2d 1381, 1385 (Conn. 1994). Similarly, in Cafarelli v. ColonCollazo, No. CV055000279S, 2006 WL 1828608 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 20, 2006), a Connecticut court held that the dispute about whether steps in a multi-step dispute resolution
clause had been satisfied was an issue for an arbitrator due to the “all-embracing” language
in the contract. Id. at *2. “[L]anguage such as disputes . . . arising out of or related to . . .
creates almost limitless jurisdiction.” Id. at *3. Accordingly, the dispute about whether
“mediation as a condition precedent to arbitration” has been satisfied was to be determined
by an arbitrator. Id. at *2 (emphasis omitted).
270 See Howsam, 537 U.S. at 85.
271 See generally Thomas J. Stipanowich, Of “Procedural Arbitrability”: The Effect of
Noncompliance with Contract Claims Procedures, 40 S.C. L. REV. 847 (1989).
272 Contec Corp. v. Remote Solution, Co., 398 F.3d 205 (2d Cir. 2005).
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serves as clear and unmistakable evidence of the parties’ intent to delegate such
issues to an arbitrator.”273
IV. ADDRESSING

THE

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

A. The Need for Clear and Meaningful Approaches—and Caution
After a generation of growing emphasis on informal methods of conflict
resolution in contractual relationships and statutory programs, the surrounding
legal landscape remains “aimless, meandering, and . . . confusing.”274 The
“penumbra” of arbitration law—a body of judicial decisions involving application of the FAA or state arbitration law to processes that are to one degree or
another different from “classic” arbitration, or to the interface between arbitration and earlier stages in multi-step dispute resolution processes—reflects the
failure of courts to articulate clear and well-reasoned approaches to the new
generation of dispute resolution tools as well as the challenges confronting
drafters of consensual and statutory dispute resolution procedures.
The application of arbitration law normally entails a variety of legal consequences affecting not only the enforcement of a dispute resolution agreement
and the outcome of the process, but also the nature of the process (including the
handling of confidentiality issues), and the powers, rights, and obligations of
the third party intervener(s).275 While it makes sense to afford arbitration law
sufficient “breathing space” to accommodate a wide range of party choice, the
application of these same legal principles to mediation and nonbinding arbitration is either illogical or of limited utility. To undertake a case-by-case analysis
of parties’ intent and understanding and relevant policy considerations in order
to determine whether or not some aspect of the FAA or state arbitration law
controls “impose[s] a significant burden on . . . courts to create a body of law
273 Id. at 208; see Qualcomm Inc. v. Nokia Corp., 466 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Terminix
Int’l Co. v. Palmer Ranch Ltd. P’ship, 432 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2005); Jacobs v. USA Track
& Field, 374 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2004); Shaw Group Inc. v. Triplefine Int’l Corp., 322 F.3d 115
(2d Cir. 2003); Apollo Computer, Inc. v. Berg, 886 F.2d 469 (1st Cir. 1989); Dream Theater,
Inc. v. Dream Theater, 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d 322 (Ct. App. 2004); James & Jackson, LLC v.
Willie Gary, LLC, 906 A.2d 76 (Del. 2006). However, a small minority of jurisdictions
have reached contrary conclusions in the absence of clear evidence of intent to submit arbitrability issues to the arbitrator. See McLaughlin Gormley King Co. v. Terminix Int’l Co.,
105 F.3d 1192 (8th Cir. 1997); Medtronic, Inc. v. ETEX Corp., No. Civ.04-1355 ADM/AJB,
2004 WL 768945 (D. Minn. Apr. 12, 2004). In Medtronic, ETEX argued that an arbitrator
ought to decide the issue of arbitrability because “the parties adopted the rules of the CPR
Institute for Dispute Resolution, which include a rule that the arbitral tribunal shall have the
power to determine the existence, validity or scope of the contract of which an arbitration
clause forms a part.” Id. at *2. The court was not persuaded, finding that “the references in
the [arbitration agreement] cited by ETEX do not state the parties adopted or incorporated
the entire set of rules.” Id. The court made this conclusion despite the fact that the agreement read, “the CPR Institute may appoint an arbitrator if the parties fail to agree, and . . .
the arbitrator shall establish other procedural rules in accordance with the then in effect CPR
Institute for Dispute Resolution Rules.” Id. The court found that “these references do not
constitute clear evidence of an intent to submit the issue of arbitrability to the arbitral
forum.” Id.
274 See supra text accompanying note 18.
275 See supra text accompanying notes 28-47.
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on what can and cannot be done, injecting more complexity and litigation into a
process aimed at less.”276 As we have seen, the burden generally outweighs
whatever benefits may be achieved by viewing ADR processes through the lens
of arbitration law.
While it may be appropriate for courts addressing other procedures to
draw upon arbitration law by analogy, this approach also provides limited guidance in the context of procedures with different goals. Should litigation be
stayed and a nonbinding, settlement-oriented process compelled? Should a
mediator or third party decision maker be accorded immunity? Should courts
enforce subpoenas issued by the third party intervener? Questions such as
these require thoughtful consideration of the parties’ intent and relevant public
policy considerations that may be very different from those underlying an
agreement for binding arbitration.
Although some courts have availed themselves of the opportunity to
employ the law of contract, including legal and equitable remedies, in support
of ADR processes, others have not.277 This judicial intransigence may result
from vestiges of the ancient “ouster of jurisdiction” doctrine,278 modern mistrust or misperceptions about ADR,279 perceived limitations on equitable
relief,280 or simple judicial ignorance. In any case, it is clear that courts need
guidance for the legal effectuation of dispute resolution procedures,281 as well
as issues on the interface between processes.282
Because we are talking about consensual or statutory processes aimed at
reducing reliance on court processes and promoting more efficient, timely,
cost-effective, and flexible solutions, litigation-producing uncertainty in the
surrounding legal framework is particularly troublesome, not to say ironic.
Judicial treatment of related legal issues should be as straightforward and as
attenuated as possible—a principle understood by the drafters of the FAA and
the original UAA.283 These legal structures were designed to minimize the role
of courts. In enforcing arbitration agreements or resulting awards—the “front
276 Lindsay v. Lewandowski, 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846, 850 (Ct. App. 2006) (emphasis omitted).
In the case of the FAA, moreover, its broad extension to other forms of ADR raises the
questionable specter of a fully federalized realm of dispute resolution. See supra text
accompanying note 30.
277 See supra notes 68, 213 and accompanying text.
278 See supra notes 68, 213 and accompanying text (extensively treating the history and
implications of the “ouster of jurisdiction” doctrine).
279 See Tim K. Klintworth, The Enforceability of an Agreement to Submit to a Non-Arbitral
Form of Dispute Resolution: The Rise of Mediation and Neutral Fact-Finding, 1995 J. DISP.
RESOL. 181, 184-89.
280 See Lucy V. Katz, Enforcing an ADR Clause—Are Good Intentions All You Have?, 26
AM. BUS. L.J. 575, 583-87 (1988) (discussing courts’ refusal to specially enforce nonbinding
dispute resolution agreements based on principle that “equity will not enforce a ‘vain order’ ”
and other similar principles).
281 See Schmitz, supra note 2, at 46-53.
282 See supra notes 242-73 and accompanying text.
283 Arnold v. Morgan Keegan & Co., 914 S.W.2d 445, 448 (Tenn. 1996) (“[T]he purpose of
the Federal and Uniform Arbitration Act is the same: to . . . [bypass] the courts.”); Francis J.
Pavetti, Why the States Should Enact the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act, 3 PEPP. DISP.
RESOL. L.J. 443, 445 (2003) (“[T]he RUAA drafters made a conscious effort throughout the
drafting process to avoid court involvement wherever possible . . . .”). But see infra text
accompanying notes 309-11.
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and back end” of arbitration—where judicial facilitation is most likely to be
needed, court involvement was nevertheless severely confined. In between, the
court role is significantly more limited. If the policy of minimal judicial
involvement pervades the law surrounding binding arbitration, it should be of
even greater importance in the case of mediation, nonbinding arbitration, and
other approaches intended to promote party self-determination through informal and flexible private mechanisms.
Caution and moderation must also be the bywords of those seeking clearer
and more rational approaches to judicial treatment of consensual and other
schemes for “appropriate dispute resolution.” The very notion of a “law of
ADR,” however well-intended, strikes some as oxymoronic.284 When it comes
to ADR, the implementing law is not an end in itself, but only a means to be
prudently employed within the narrow bounds of necessity. Legal reformers
must take care that in attempting to solve a perceived problem around the edges
of ADR they don’t undermine the very flexibility and autonomy they seek to
facilitate.285 In evaluating options for the effectuation of ADR processes, a
balance must be struck between the need for judicial help to encourage and
promote creative solutions and the need to minimize the judicial burden and the
broader transaction costs of facilitating out-of-court alternatives.
B. Statutory Reform and Its Pitfalls
1. Superficial Benefits of Expansive Statutes
On a superficial level, statutory reform (as, for example, in the form of a
uniform dispute resolution statute that complements the Uniform Arbitration
Act and the Uniform Mediation Act) appears to offer a straightforward way of
addressing the “cases of trouble” surrounding the enforcement of ADR procedures. A legislative structure providing a framework for addressing the “major
arteries” of consensual conflict resolution, including mediation and nonbinding
third-party decision-making procedures, seemingly could provide grounding for
clearer and more systematic judicial management of out-of-court dispute resolution procedures by avoiding unnecessary transaction costs associated with lit284 See Coben & Thompson, supra note 3. As Charles Pou has observed, “[T]here is an
obvious tension in the very idea of ‘ADR laws,’ all of which are, in a sense, trying to
legislate flexibility. Some see this irony as inherently ridiculous, and believe it best to say
nothing by statute—thus avoiding slippery slopes and any need to interpret.” Charles Pou,
Jr., Things That ADR Legislation Can and Cannot Do Well, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Summer
2001, at 7, 8. Ironically, one of the incentives cited by those touting the use of mediation in
international disputes is the increasing legalization of arbitration. See Steven J. Burton,
Combining Conciliation with Arbitration of International Commercial Disputes, 18 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 637 (1995) (noting growing use of litigation practices in
international arbitration).
Like it or not, however, we live in an era reflecting the “ADRization of litigation” as
well as the “litigization of ADR.” Thomas O. Main, ADR: The New Equity, 74 U. CIN. L.
REV. 329, 404 (2005).
285 See Robert M. Jones, Florida’s Experience with Dispute Resolution Legislation: Too
Much of a Good Thing?, 1, 2 (2000), http://consensus.fsu.edu/ADR/PDFS/FloridaADR.pdf
(observing that advocates of ADR legislation tend to “overstate the problem and oversell the
solution”; decrying “[o]ne size fits all” approach taken by some ADR legislation; ignoring
contextual needs and variations among processes).
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igation.286 It could articulate and reinforce the policies supporting legal
enforcement of ADR provisions that do not entail a binding award, eradicate
the misplaced reliance on arbitration law that has clouded recent jurisprudence,
and provide courts a level of comfort regarding the use of specific performance
with respect to mediation and nonbinding arbitration provisions. The law
might also serve a “channeling” function by establishing certain formalities as
requisites for summary enforcement, as well as default provisions to serve as a
“safety net” for agreements. Drafters of contracts considering the use of such
procedures could face reduced transaction costs and risks.
The process of developing the law could permit important and overdue
dialogue among practitioners and commentators along the rapidly eroding professional boundaries between arbitration, mediation, and other processes. It
could also serve as a model for the national evolution of mediation and other
nonbinding procedures.
Some examples of statutory frameworks currently exist within the realm
of international commercial mediation, suggesting at least a partial scope (and a
starting point for discussion) for a statutory enactment covering forms of nonbinding dispute resolution as well as “interface” issues. These include the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”)
Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation287 and counterparts legislated in several U.S. states, exemplified by the California International Arbitration and Conciliation Act.288 These enactments address a wide array of
points of law surrounding conciliation (mediation), including (1) public policies
supporting the use of conciliation;289 (2) standards for the scope of legal
enforcement, including the requirement of a record;290 (3) the definition of the
“commence[ment]” of the process;291 (4) confidentiality;292 (5) minimum
requirements regarding the appointment of conciliators (mediators), including
disclosure requirements;293 (6) choice of representatives;294 (7) agreements to
stay judicial or arbitral proceedings, and the roles of courts or arbitrators;295 (8)
suspension of limitation periods and the roles of courts or arbitrators; (9) service of process and the immunity of participants;296 (10) the immunity of con286 Cf. Pou, supra note 284, at 9 (effective ADR legislation could “reflect an appropriate
general balance between prescription and flexibility in employing these processes, protecting
sensitive communications, acquiring neutrals services and assuring judicial oversight”).
287 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation (2002); see Pieter
Sanders, UNCITRAL’s Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation, 23 ARB.
INT’L 105 (2007) (critiquing and proposing changes to the UNCITRAL Model Law); Erik
van Ginkel, The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation—A Critical Appraisal, 21 J. INT’L ARB. 1 (2004) (heavily critiquing the UNCITRAL Model Law).
288 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1297.11-1297.432 (West 2007).
289 § 1297.341; see, e.g., UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial
Conciliation.
290 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation art. 1.
291 § 1297.211.
292 § 1297.371.
293 § 1297.121.
294 § 1297.351.
295 § 1297.381.
296 § 1297.431.
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ciliators;297 (11) conciliator’s evaluations;298 (12) the role of conciliators in
preparing draft conciliation settlements;299 (13) the admissibility of communications or evidence used in conciliation in later arbitration or litigation, and
nondisclosure;300 and (14) the enforcement of a conciliated settlement agreement.301 A number of these standards address the interface between mediation/
conciliation and arbitration in the context of multi-step procedures, as do provisions governing (15) conciliators acting as arbitrators;302 (16) arbitrators acting
as conciliators;303 (17) arbitral awards on agreed terms;304 and (18) the impact
of a conciliated settlement agreement and the procedure for converting it to an
arbitration award.305
2. Problems and pitfalls
It is no accident, however, that no federal or state statute attempts to
address ADR processes comprehensively. The sheer range of ADR procedures,
the diverse goals of parties, and differing public policy considerations raise
daunting barriers to would-be drafters. It is not simply for historical reasons
that existing statutes tend to focus on more limited process taxonomies or “families,” such as arbitration (the FAA or the UAA)306 or mediation (the UMA),307
and why the latter is extremely limited in scope. No effort has been made on
either the federal or state level to regulate the entire broad and diverse range of
nonbinding arbitration and other nonbinding third-party decision-making
processes.308
Promulgating legislation requires considerable care, and the challenges
increase dramatically with the scope of regulation. A statute purporting to
cover even an entire family of procedures such as binding arbitration is of such
breadth as to raise formidable tensions between providing meaningful support
for private agreements and over-regulating. As an object lesson, those seeking
to improve the legal framework of ADR should consider the reform of the
UAA, undertaken in the late 1990s.309 That initiative produced a revision more
than double the length of its minimalist predecessor, transforming a barebones
legal interface to facilitate arbitration agreements into a forthright regulator of
due process in arbitration proceedings.310 The development of the RUAA
297

§ 1297.432.
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation art. 6 (2002).
299 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1297.361; § 1297.362 (no party required to accept draft agreement proposed by conciliator).
300 § 1297.371.
301 § 1297.401.
302 § 1297.351; UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation art. 12.
303 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1297.301.
304 §§ 1297.303-.304.
305 § 1297.401.
306 See supra text accompanying notes 25-26.
307 See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
308 See supra text accompanying notes 182-97.
309 See supra note 26.
310 See supra note 26. Many (though by no means all) of the statutory reforms reflect
legitimate, deep-felt due process concerns about the expanding use and potential abuse of
private, binding arbitration under boilerplate provisions in standardized adhesion contracts
involving employees, consumers, and others. Their application is, however, made general
298
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exemplifies the difficulties of relying too heavily on statutory reform, especially when the statute is intended to be of broad application.311 The RUAA
and recent modifications to the California Arbitration Act312 illustrate the pitfalls of crafting a “one-size-fits-all” statute that governs dispute resolution provisions in consumer and employment contracts, which may be contracts of
adhesion,313 as well as commercial agreements.314
By way of contrast, the drafters of the UMA declined the opportunity to
address many of the current legal issues surrounding mediation,315 instead takby the terms of the uniform statute. It is too early to assess the overall impact of the RUAA,
but it is reasonable to assume that it may reinforce current trends in the direction of making
arbitration more “legalistic”; for example, the author has heard anecdotal evidence that the
RUAA’s textual treatment of discovery, while not intending to mandate its use, may have led
some lawyers to conclude that discovery is required in commercial arbitration regardless of
the specific provisions in the parties’ agreement.
311 See Jones, supra note 285.
312 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.85 (West 2007); CAL. CT. R., ETHICS STANDARDS FOR
NEUTRAL ARBITRATORS IN CONTRACTUAL ARBITRATION (2002); JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, CALIFORNIA RULES OF COURT (2007). These provisions were aimed primarily at
consumer and employment arbitration but also establish stringent requirements for disclosure
of potential conflicts of interest by arbitrators in commercial cases. See Ruth V. Glick,
California Arbitation Reform: The Aftermath, 38 U.S.F. L. Rev. 119 (2003) (critically
appraising the statutory “ethics standards”). Among other things, arbitrators are required to
disclose all matters that could cause a person aware of the facts to reasonably entertain a
doubt that the proposed arbitration would be able to be impartial. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 1297.121. The statute permits parties to disqualify the arbitrators based on such disclosures within fifteen days after receiving the disclosure statement. § 1281.91(b)(1). First of
all, the disclosures arbitrators are required to make are not limited to those that might be
considered material, and even non-material disclosures trigger an automatic right on the
parties to disqualify the arbitrator. They create the potential for cynical manipulation of the
arbitration process and dramatically increased transaction costs. By way of illustration, consider the situation in which, months or years into the arbitration of a complex commercial
case, a party who fears it will be on the losing end of the arbitrator’s award hires new
counsel or identifies a witness having some relationship to the arbitrator for the purpose of
creating a requirement for the arbitrator to make a supplemental disclosure under the statute.
The arbitrator’s disclosure triggers an automatic right to disqualify without regard to materiality. Should the arbitrator fail to make a disclosure within the scope of the statute, an
“aggrieved” party may move to vacate the award, again without regard to the materiality of
the non-disclosure.
To many business clients the statute’s disclosure requirements, and the ability of parties
to disqualify arbitrators based on disclosures, are superfluous in light of administrative
mechanisms for handling arbitrator disclosures and challenges. Moreover, given the potential risks and higher transaction costs described above, at least some commercial parties
would prefer to incorporate contract terms waiving the statute and its “protections.” This
may not be possible, however. A recent court decision interpreted the California statute as
requiring commercial parties to comply with the disclosure requirements of the statute,
which it interpreted as trumping the institutional disclosure and challenge procedures incorporated in the arbitration provision of the parties’ contract. Azteca Constr., Inc. v. ADR
Consulting, Inc., 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 142 (Ct. App. 2004).
313 See generally Stipanowich, supra note 2, at 888-90.
314 Id.
315 Paul Bennett Marrow, Coming to New York? An Unconscionable Mediation Agreement,
N.Y. ST. B. J. July-Aug. 2006, at 40, 41 (“[I]t is a mistake to assume that the UMA is farreaching. Unfortunately, in its present form, it is shallow and leaves many issues for determination by the courts.”); Andrea K. Schneider, Which Means to an End Under the Uniform
Mediation Act?, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 2 (2001) (“The goals of the UMA are quite simple. . . .
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ing a narrowly cabined approach to the task of establishing uniform standards
for courts. The resulting uniform legislation is confined primarily to confidentiality issues, and even that treatment is limited to legal enforcement of mediation privileges and related exceptions.316 For a variety of reasons,317 no effort
was made to provide guidance for more general enforcement of agreements to
mediate or of mediated settlement agreements.
As noted above, the primary examples of more all-embracing statutory
regulation have been confined to the international realm, with an emphasis on
the use of mediation provisions in international commercial contracts.318 Even
in the international sphere, some question the value of regulation since, with the
exception of Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, and some other common
law countries, commercial mediation/conciliation practice outside the United
States has yet to develop on a broad scale.319 A leading international expert on
mediation insists that among other things such regulation is premature,320 and
others have levied sharp criticisms at many elements of the UNCITRAL Model
Law.321 On a broader plane, there is as yet no evidence that the failure to
develop a suitable legal framework for conflict resolution is undermining the
United States’ position as a forum of choice in an increasingly competitive
global dispute resolution market.
Additionally, there is always the concern that the rough-and-tumble, often
unpredictable process of legislating will produce a solution that is as bad as or
worse than the problem that it purports to solve. Although NCCUSL’s
approach to the promulgation of uniform laws is in a number of respects superior to other legislative processes,322 it remains a “political” process that is
subject to pressures from special interest groups.323 Moreover, NCCUSL
enactments are not “law” until they have been adopted by state legislatures, and
herein lies the potential for further mischief: At this point, non-uniform enactments may undermine central purposes of the statute.324
From a cost-risk-benefit perspective, the best approach may be efforts
addressing specific regulatory schemes incorporating dispute resolution proAs outlined by the Prefatory Note to the UMA and Hughes, the UMA tries to meet the
following three obligations: (1) the reasonable expectations of parties regarding confidentiality, (2) the integrity of the mediation process, and (3) the policy that parties have the
ultimate decision-making authority or self-determination.” (footnotes omitted)).
316 UNIF. MEDIATION ACT, prefatory note (2001) (discussing the purpose of the UMA:
“[T]he law has the unique capacity to assure that the reasonable expectations of participants
regarding the confidentiality of the mediation process are met.”).
317 See Schmitz, supra note 2, at 12-14.
318 See supra text accompanying notes 287-305.
319 NANCY NELSON ET AL., COMMERCIAL MEDIATION IN EUROPE: BETTER SOLUTIONS FOR
BUSINESS (2004).
320 “The field is too young for rules . . . there is not even a common agreement on models of
mediation.” Interview with Karl Mackie, Executive Director, Centre for Effective Dispute
Resolution (CeDR), in London, Eng. (May 10, 2007).
321 See generally Sanders, supra note 287; van Ginkel, supra note 287.
322 Thomas J. Stipanowich, Reconstructing Construction Law: Reality and Reform in a
Transactional System, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 463, 547-51.
323 Id. at 554.
324 Id. at 554-55.
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grams325 and other statutes incorporating dispute resolution procedures. Drafters should have before them a checklist of key legal issues to consider and
possibly address in the statute, including mechanisms for judicial enforcement
of dispute resolution procedures such as stays of related litigation and orders to
compel, and related provisions for venue; judicial authority to appoint neutrals
where the parties fail to do so; standards for judicial confirmation, vacatur or
modification of awards (if any) and related venue provisions; legal immunity of
interveners; and the interaction of the statute with the FAA or other arbitration
statutes.326
Meanwhile, although parties and counsel should be encouraged to explore
new and creative avenues for constructive resolution of conflict, those who opt
for consensual process templates other than classic arbitration (or other
processes that fall within well-defined procedural regimes) have a responsibility to anticipate the possibility that their process will raise novel questions of
law, including enforcement of participation in the process, review or effectuation of the outcome, the protection of related communications, and the powers,
rights, and obligations of third party interveners. Some and perhaps all of these
issues should be specifically addressed in the parties’ agreement.
C. A Restatement of Dispute Resolution?
The American Law Institute is currently considering the development of a
Restatement of International Commercial Arbitration,327 an initiative acknowledging the growing importance of arbitration in the resolution of cross-border
commercial disputes and the need to establish clearer guidelines regarding sur325 An existing example would be a specific regulatory structure incorporating a dispute
resolution mechanism that is associated with domain name registration. See Management of
Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,741 (June 10, 1998) (authorizing individual
registrars to issue domain names in the generic top level domain names, and the administration of country code top domains is delegated by ICANN); see also Helfer & Dinwoodie,
supra note 180, at 149 n.16. The full text of the UDRP and supplementary materials are
available from ICANN, Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (Oct. 24, 1999),
http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/policy.htm.
326 Another possibility would be to amend the FAA and UAA to define “arbitration” for the
purpose of the statutes. One relatively tight “classic” formulation would be as follows:

For the purposes of this Act, “arbitration” means “[a] process of dispute resolution in which an
impartial third party renders a final, binding decision (award) after a hearing at which both
parties have an opportunity to be heard.”

For the sake of completeness one might also include a definition of “arbitration agreement”:
“Arbitration agreement” is an agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration all or certain
disputes which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not. An arbitration agreement may be in the form of an arbitration clause in a contract or in the form of a separate agreement.

UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration art. 7(1) (amended 2006).
However, this is probably not necessary given the clear references to agreements to arbitrate
in various sections of the FAA.
327 See email from Harry Kyriakodis, Librarian, American Law Institute to Donald Buffaloe, Pepperdine University School of Law (August 6, 2007) (indicating that the ALI is
considering an International Commercial Arbitration Project, although no formal prospectus
has been drafted for the Council to consider).
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rounding legal issues.328 That initiative suggests the possibility of a similar
approach to address the need for a clearer and more coherent legal framework
for the broader landscape of dispute resolution in the United States.329
A decade ago, Carrie Menkel-Meadow advanced a thoughtful if ultimately
unfruitful proposal to amend the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers to
address the roles of lawyers engaged in ADR.330 Although my emphasis here
is somewhat different, I am persuaded that the Restatement may be a particularly useful approach to “clarify[ing] the law and . . . provid[ing] a text that
courts and other legal bodies deciding contested cases can employ . . . [as well
as] ‘serv[ing] as an educational and reference tool’ for lawyers . . . and
others.”331 I endorse Professor Menkel-Meadow’s suggestion that we explore
ways in which the Restatement may be made responsive to current dispute resolution practice and propose an informal effort to develop a possible Restatement structure. Without rejecting Professor Menkel-Meadow’s
recommendations for revisions to the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, I propose the consideration of a freestanding Restatement of Dispute Resolution aimed at consensual dispute resolution procedures, along the lines of
the FAA or UAA, and perhaps addressing statute-based and court-connected
procedures as well.332 Although page limitations preclude a detailed proposal
here, I envision a standard encompassing key legal principles associated with
different forms of contract-based dispute resolution under a series of sections
devoted to mediation, binding arbitration,333 and other procedures for nonbinding third-party decision-making.334 To the extent possible, each section would
328 Email from Jack Coe, Professor of Law, Pepperdine University Law School, to the
author (July 31, 2007) (on file with the author) (transmitting concept paper for project).
329 An alternative would be to expand the new ALI initiative to address other consensual
conflict resolution approaches, including mediation and nonbinding arbitration, in international transactions.
330 See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Silences of the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers: Lawyering as Only Adversary Practice, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 631
(1997).
331 Id. at 632 n.4 (quoting Nancy Moore, Restating the Law of Lawyer Conflicts, 10 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 541 (1997)).
332 Inclusion of court-connected or statute-based dispute resolution procedures would probably introduce significant complications but should be considered. The UNCITRAL Model
Law on Conciliation addressed not only conciliation based on parties’ agreement but also
noncontractual mediation. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.021 (Vernon 2001)
(current version at TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 152.001 (Vernon 2007)); TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.023 (Vernon 2007) (including non-contractual
mediation).
333 Because binding arbitration is now regulated by federal and state statutes, Restatement
drafters have previously elected not to address it in detail. See Stephen K. Huber, Arbitration and Contracts: What Are the Law Schools Teaching?, 21 J. AM. ARB. 209, 254 (2003)
(noting that the Restatement of Contracts, Chapter 8, Unenforceability on Grounds of Public
Policy, “states that rules are not included for fields in which legislation is preeminent, such
as arbitration”). On the other hand, the inclusion of binding arbitration in a Restatement
would facilitate an integrated, comprehensive treatment of consensual dispute resolution procedures, including issues involving the “interface” between arbitration and other processes,
and permit considered reflection on the growing body of relevant law, including laws relating to arbitration provisions in adhesion contracts.
334 As suggested above, taxonometric approaches to nonbinding third party decision-making
procedures are rendered difficult by the sheer diversity of approaches. See supra text
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follow a similar structure, beginning with a treatment of relevant policies.
Common topics would include grounds for and scope of enforcement, judicial
appointment of interveners, immunity of interveners, confidentiality, the legal
effect of awards or other “results” of procedures, and grounds for judicial
review or vacatur, if any. Sections would, of course, vary dramatically in detail
due to the significant variance among processes.335
A well-drafted Restatement of Dispute Resolution might serve as an integrated “shadow framework” of legal principles supporting and regulating the
use of out-of-court conflict resolution alternatives including binding arbitration,
mediation, nonbinding arbitration, and other nonbinding third-party decisionmaking processes. Because it would be promulgated outside the vast “crazy
quilt” of present federal and state legislation and decisional law, the need to
harmonize with current law would in many cases be of less importance than
identifying and promoting the most effective legal principles. Its power to
influence courts and legislators while giving confidence to contract drafters
would lie in its strong provenance, its unique breadth, and the power of an
integrated and thoughtful approach to the range of legal issues surrounding dispute resolution processes.336
The Restatement would permit close analysis of the operation of key
forms of nonbinding conflict resolution including mediation, nonbinding arbitration, appraisals, decisions by design professionals on construction projects,
and other processes. The document would provide clear guidance for courts on
the policies supporting judicial enforcement of nonbinding processes and the
scope of such action.
Compared to legislative processes, the Restatement offers a relatively
careful, conservative process involving the efforts of experienced scholars,
judges, and practitioners. While the process certainly envisions considerable
give and take with respect to the issues, there is less likelihood of the final
outcome representing last-minute lobbying by special interest groups.337 At the
same time, its provenance could underline its relative importance and influence
in the field.
Even if confined to consensual agreements for dispute resolution, a
Restatement would involve a degree of synthesis never before attempted (or
even seriously contemplated) in the field of dispute resolution.338 At a time
accompanying notes 182-97. This should not, however, discourage an attempt at identifying
and treating general process categories.
335 For example, possible elements of a section on mediation are suggested by provisions of
the UNCITRAL Model Law on Conciliation and the California International Arbitration and
Conciliation Act. See supra text accompanying notes 287-305.
336 Indeed, an initiative of this kind would provide a forum for addressing many of the
topics covered in this Symposium, not just the “penumbra” issues raised in this article.
337 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 330, at 632 (though critical, characterizing a particular
Restatement process as “a noble effort” and “a heroic gathering” of pertinent case law and
other standards in an effort to address “difficult and often contentious issues”). But see Ted
Schneyer, The ALI’s Restatement and the ABA’s Model Rules: Rivals or Complements?, 46
OKLA. L. REV. 25, 26-27 (1993) (raising concerns that the ALI in addressing the law of
lawyering may be yielding to professional self-protectionism by members of the bar).
338 Such synthesis is also rare in scholarship. One very ambitious exception was Richard C.
Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution and
Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949 (2000) (proposing a “unitary” understanding of
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when there is considerable experience with a wide array of approaches to the
out-of-court resolution of disputes, including complex multi-step procedures,
and when professional practice among lawyers and neutral interveners is
embracing multiple processes, the field is sufficiently mature to conduct a
thoughtful dialogue and debate on policy and principles transcending traditional process boundaries. To date, most standards for dispute resolution have
focused on specific processes, with little or no reference to or consideration of
other procedures.339 Thus, for example, the Uniform Arbitration Act was
revised without a consideration of mediation and nonbinding arbitration procedures, and the Uniform Mediation Act was only marginally affected by arbitration law.340 The development of a Restatement would engage experts from
diverse backgrounds in a wide-ranging discussion of policies and principles
associated with different forms of dispute resolution. Topics such as the immunity of third-party interveners may be explored and addressed comprehensively,
with careful re-examination of the policies supporting immunity for those serving in arbitral and other “quasi-judicial” roles versus those acting in more
purely facilitative capacities.341 There would be an opportunity for the discrete
treatment of special considerations associated with adhesion contracts without
the concerns about federal preemption that limited discussion and debate during
the development of the RUAA,342 as well as more careful consideration of the
interrelationships between intervener independence and impartiality, disclosure
of potential conflicts of interest, and judicial enforcement.343 “Interface” issues
involving multi-step processes could also be addressed, along with issues of
arbitral finality and other topics addressed344 in this Symposium.
The promulgation of yet another set of standards for out-of-court dispute
resolution, especially one so broad-based, will strike some as a superfluous or
even foolhardy effort.345 Advocates for out-of-court processes, especially
mediation and other nonbinding processes, may argue that an emphasis on
legalities totally misses the point or threatens the vitality of our experimentapublic civil dispute resolution, including private ADR proceedings, prompted by constitutional concerns).
339 See CAL. CT. R., ETHICS STANDARDS FOR NEUTRAL ARBITRATORS IN CONTRACTUAL
ARBITRATION (2002); CPR-GEORGETOWN COMMISSION ON ETHICS AND STANDARDS IN ADR,
MODEL RULE FOR THE LAWYER AS THIRD-PARTY NEUTRAL (2002).
340 See UNIF. MEDIATION ACT art. 9 (2001) (establishing requirements for mediator disclosure, reflecting similar provisions in the RUAA).
341 See supra text accompanying notes 155-64.
342 See Stipanowich, supra note 2, at 894.
343 See id. at 873-74 (discussing concerns with decision-making by third parties aligned
with or employed by a single party).
344 See supra text accompanying notes 242-73.
345 See Steven H. Goldberg, “Wait a Minute. This Is Where I Came In.” A Trial Lawyer’s
Search for Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1997 BYU L. REV. 653, 655 (noting with concern
the increasing emphasis on what Professor Menkel-Meadow describes as “The Law of
ADR” and querying whether a Restatement of the Law of ADR can be far behind); see also
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Non-Silences of Professor Hazard on “The Silences of the Restatement”: A Response to Professor Menkel-Meadow, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 671 (1997)
(expressing serious reservations regarding Professor Menkel-Meadow’s suggestion regarding proposed changes to the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers to include nonadversary models).
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tion with consensual processes;346 commercial arbitration proponents may fear
that a new and comprehensive standard (even with discrete treatment of binding arbitration) may undermine long-accepted traditional principles such as
arbitral immunity. One cannot say with great confidence that such concerns are
misplaced or that the costs of such a standard will clearly outweigh the benefits.
For this reason, the concept and potential scope of a Restatement of Dispute
Resolution should be carefully vetted prior to the presentation of a proposal to
the American Law Institute. A multi-disciplinary group of thoughtful scholars,
jurists, practitioners, and advocates of key “stakeholder” groups (such as businesses, employees, and consumers) should be brought together to consider the
possibilities and concerns associated with this approach. Even if the effort
demonstrates the futility of developing a Restatement, it is likely to engender
important debate “across boundaries” and may produce new ideas or even areas
of consensus on relevant principles or policies; one possible product would be
an authoritative new treatise or reference source on consensual dispute
resolution.
CONCLUSION
The widening “penumbra” of arbitration law manifests various issues with
which courts have struggled on the interface between the justice system and the
diverse realms of out-of-court dispute resolution. Uncertainties regarding the
boundaries of arbitration law and options for the legal treatment of other dispute resolution processes have resulted in conflicting judicial precedents and
commensurate gray areas for drafters. Although arbitration law needs a degree
of “breathing space” to accommodate party choices, it is an inappropriate or
very limited template for mediation and other nonbinding dispute resolution
processes. Although some courts have embraced ready alternatives in contract
law, including equitable approaches to enforcement, there remains a great need
for meaningful and authoritative guidance in this arena. In this regard, statutory reform presents significant challenges and dangers. Careful consideration
should be given to the possible development of a Restatement of Dispute Resolution; even if a Restatement approach is ultimately rejected, a well-structured
multi-disciplinary discussion may produce important new guidance for the
field.

346

See supra text accompanying notes 283-85.

